Creating and destroying diaspora strategies

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- analyse migration as part of broader global change
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Abstract

New Zealand, like many countries, has recently shifted from disparaging emigrants to celebrating expatriates as heroes. What explains this change? The new government initiatives towards expatriates have been attributed to a neoliberal ‘diaspora strategy’, aimed at constructing emigrants and their descendants as part of a community of knowledge-bearing subjects, in order to help the New Zealand economy ‘go global’ (Larner 2007: 80). The research in this paper confirms that the new diaspora initiatives emerged from a process of neoliberal reform. However, it also highlights that, in the same period, older, inherited institutional frameworks for interacting with expatriates were being dismantled as part of a different dynamic within the same wider neoliberalization process. In this way, the research builds on and refines the ‘diaspora strategy’ concept by placing it within a broader analysis of institutional transformation through ‘creative destruction’. At the same time, this study opens up a wider research agenda aimed at revealing, understanding and explaining how states have related to diasporas before and beyond the era of neoliberalism.

Keywords: New Zealand; diaspora strategies; multi-sited ethnography; extra-territorial citizenship; creative destruction; neoliberalism

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Introduction

Around the turn of this century, in many countries, there was a distinct shift from denouncing expatriates as deserters and traitors, to celebrating them as heroes and model citizens. At the vanguard of this shift was Irish President Mary Robinson who, in the early 1990s, broke from precedent by declaring her wish to ‘represent’ the ‘vast community of Irish emigrants’ living beyond her state (Robinson 1994), pointing out that, ‘if we are honest we will acknowledge that those who leave do not always feel cherished’ (Robinson 1995). A few years later, Mexico’s Vicente Fox overturned the traditional image of Mexican emigrants as ‘pochos’ who have abandoned their roots, heralding them ‘the cultural engine, the permanent ambassadors of Mexican culture’ (Martinez-Saldana 2003: 34). These are but the two most prominent of similar shifts that occurred all around the world in this period; all of a sudden it seemed that states everywhere were casting aside their long-held suspicions about emigrants, and recasting them in a new and positive light.

One of these countries was New Zealand – a case that has come to epitomize many of the dynamics driving contemporary state-diaspora relations (Larner, 2007: 342). In mid 2000, New Zealand’s Business Roundtable financed a full page ad in the New Zealand Herald warning the recently elected Labour Government that, ‘Unless we turn things around, New Zealand runs the risk of permanently losing the best of our next generation’, and naming 700 young expatriate New Zealanders who had given support to the message (see Appendix 1). Several months later, when pressured by the Australian Government to cover the social security bill for New Zealanders in Australia, Prime Minister Helen Clark told journalists that New Zealanders in Australia ‘would not get a bean’, if she could help it (Alley, 2000). ‘Why on earth would we pay money to people who are turning their backs and leaving the country?’ she demanded. Political cartoonist Garrick Tremain encapsulated the perceived attitude towards expatriates in a cartoon showing people headed for an airport’s international terminal as ‘ratbag traitors who don’t deserve a great government’.

Figure 1: Garrick Tremain: The New Zealand Brain Drain Debate, 2000

By the middle of the next year, however, the same Government’s tune had changed remarkably. Deputy Prime Minister Jim Anderton was declaiming that he believed ‘New Zealanders, wherever they are in the world, are always New Zealanders. They retain a commitment to their homeland and identify themselves as New Zealanders….I can see New Zealand as a nation with, at least in one sense, no frontiers’ (Anderton 2001). Soon, the Prime Minister herself, in a tacit apology for her previous remarks, was crooning to a roomful of expatriate glitterati that, ‘It’s not so long ago that expat Kiwis were almost considered to have let New Zealand down by leaving….In the 21st century those attitudes had to change – and they are changing…. [T]hose who stay offshore can be a huge asset to our country – opening up their networks and contacts to New Zealand-based businesses, researchers, and professionals seeking to expand their global linkages.’

What happened? Why did the same government appear derisive and spiteful towards expatriates in one moment, then warm to the point of obsequiousness in the next? This paper argues that the New Zealand Government’s shifting orientation towards its expatriates in this period reflects a transition between phases of the country’s ongoing neoliberal transformation. The initial, exclusionary approach towards expatriates can be seen as part of the tail end of a 15-year process of ‘roll back’ neoliberal restructuring, involving economic deregulation, deep cuts in state spending, reform of the public sector and particularly of the welfare system, and state asset sales. In this ‘destructive’ neoliberal climate of cutbacks and austerity, the social security entitlements of New Zealand citizens who no longer fell within New Zealand’s tax net was low on the new Labour Government’s list of spending priorities. By contrast, the Government’s later embracing attitude towards expatriates should be seen as part of a new process of ‘roll out’ neoliberal reforms, driven by a ‘Third Way’ philosophy of strategic partnering between states and markets. In this new environment, political and business leaders sought new ways to optimize the performance of markets through state actions to suppress ‘market failures’ and support ‘positive externalities’. Engaging expatriates was seized upon as a creative way of amplifying one of emigration’s positive side effects – namely expatriates’ transnational contributions – and using these to counteract the feared market failure of ‘brain drain’.

1 Diaspora strategies and neoliberalism

Like many good and important ideas, the term ‘diaspora’ has often been overused, and consequently there has been much debate over what it actually means (Safran, 1991, Cohen 1997; Tölölyan 1996). According to one kind of current consensus, the essential features of a diaspora group are physical dispersion, ‘homeland’ orientation, and maintenance of a durable group identity (see e.g. Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001). Understood in this way, a diaspora can be succinctly defined as ‘an imagined community living away from a professed place of origin’ (Vertovec 2009: 5) – a definition that is specific enough to be useful yet broad enough to encompass not only the Jews and other archetypal diasporas, but also more recent emigrant and expatriate groups (see e.g. Hugo 2006).

However, diaspora research has begun to move beyond classifying diasporas and their characteristics, to look at how and why these groups emerge and dissipate (see e.g. Dufoix 2008; Sökefeld 2006; Brubaker 2005; Vertovec 1997). A crucial insight from such studies is that people are more or less ‘diasporic’ in different circumstances. Wars, natural disasters, political campaigns, celebrations and sporting events can all galvanize a sense of nostalgia and congregation among people with links to a distant home. Diasporas are not fixed, pre-existing groups; instead, Steven Vertovec writes, diaspora identity ‘may be lost entirely, may ebb and flow, be hot or cold, switched on or off, remain active or dormant. The degree of attachment – and mobilization around it – often depends upon events affecting the purported homeland’ (Vertovec 2005).

A key point to recognize is that governments can be a focal point for activities that can periodically galvanize diverse and dispersed networks into a cohesive diaspora. As Larner (2007) argues, ‘diaspora strategies’ are less directed at a pre-existing group, and more intended to constitute such a group, for instrumental purposes. This social-constructivist or ‘strategic essentialist’ approach (Spivak, 1993) to diaspora is now more or less pervasive. In particular, approaches drawing on Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991 [1978]) (see below) are becoming increasingly common (see e.g. Gamlen 2009; Ragazzi 2009). However, a central contribution of Larner’s account is to link this diaspora-building form of strategic essentialism closely to the neoliberal transformations that have occurred since the latter twentieth century. Thus, in order to understand the concept of diaspora strategy, it is necessary to examine the notion of ‘neoliberalism’.

Although neoliberalism is often used glibly along with (or in place of) the word ‘globalization’ (Agnew 2009: 16; Larner 2003: 509), the term has a complex archaeology. As the suffix ‘ism’ suggests, neoliberalism is perhaps first and foremost an ideology. As David Harvey puts it (2007: 2): ‘Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.’ Harvey traces the lineage of this ideology to the founding in 1947 of the Mont Pelerin Society, consisting of a group of academic economists, philosophers and historians – including Milton Friedman and, temporarily, Karl Popper – around Austrian political philosopher Friederich von Hayek. From the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European liberals they took an adherence to the ideal of personal freedom, which they fused onto free-market ideals of nineteenth-century neo-classical economics, into an ideological hybrid that was inimical not only to central state planning but to most existing theories of state intervention (Harvey 2007: 20–1).

However, Harvey also notes that, as an ideology, neoliberalism is fraught with deep internal tensions and contradictions (see especially pp. 79–80). To begin with, different notions of personal freedom may be incompatible; as Isaiah Berlin showed, freedom ‘from’ external interference in the ‘private’ realm means something quite different from freedom ‘to’ equal opportunities in the public realm (Berlin, 1969); the former entails a minimalist state set up largely for the protection of private property, whereas the latter implies a state that much more actively redistributes the benefits of economic activity. Neoliberals, like their classic liberal antecedents, tend to prefer negative liberty, even though this prescribes
the protection of private property by a potentially authoritarian state, which jars against the ideology of personal autonomy. A similar tension lies between the neoliberal ideal of efficiency through competition, and the reality that competition fosters monopolies and oligopolies which, ironically, call for the very regulatory intervention that the neoliberal state is supposed to shun. Thus, as Harvey illustrates, there are deep internal contradictions within neoliberal thought and practice, concerning the nature of personal freedoms and how to achieve them through particular relationships between states and markets.

Underlying Harvey’s Marxian critique is a distinction between neoliberalism in theory and neoliberalism in practice – a distinction that Brenner and Theodore (2002) capture and sharpen in their notion of ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism. In their analysis, actually existing neoliberalism is characterized by ‘creative destruction’: an unfolding dialectic between destructive and creative moments of neoliberal inspired reform. Destructive moments involve programmes aimed at dismantling inherited institutional architectures in the name of de-regulation and privatization, whereas creative moments involve the establishment of new market-friendly and market-mimicking forms of state regulation, aimed at capturing and managing market ‘externalities’ (the wider societal benefits and costs of individual economic activity). These Janus faces of neoliberalism have been differently described as ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ respectively (Peck and Tickell 2002). In many cases – including the New Zealand one examined below – these two dynamics occur in overlapping phases. For example, the notion of ‘roll back neoliberalism’ succinctly characterizes the sweeping reforms initiated by Britain’s Margaret Thatcher and the USA’s Ronald Reagan (as well as New Zealand’s Roger Douglas and Ruth Richardson). Conversely, the idea of ‘roll out neoliberalism’ fits well with the softer ‘Third Way’ approach subsequently taken by Tony Blair and Bill Clinton (and, in New Zealand, by Helen Clark).

Larner, in Larner and Walters (2004) and Larner (2000) adds to this distinction between neoliberalism as ideology and neoliberalism as actual policy programme, suggesting that neoliberalism should be seen as a mode of ‘governmentality’ – a term coined by Michel Foucault (1991 [1978]) to denote, among other things, a peculiarly liberal way of thinking about government, which aims to optimize population welfare rather than to control territory, and operates through the active consent of self-governing citizens rather than through discipline and sovereignty (see Dean 1999: 16–20). Neoliberal governmentality has at its heart the glorification of the market, and the notion that government action should be ‘market-mimicking’ (Sandel 2009) in order to instil in citizens the correct cultural rules and values of self-responsibility and active participation. This has involved contracting out governmental functions and monitoring, as well as evaluating and optimizing their performance, with the aim of ‘engaging’ and ‘empowering’ stakeholder networks and communities to become more active in their own self-government (Dean 1999: 167–8).

Larner (2007) links this notion of neoliberalism as governmentality directly to the ‘diaspora strategy’ concept. In the context of a world-wide rash of similar diaspora-building initiatives, she examines innovative programmes to engage expatriate experts as part of a ‘formal diaspora strategy’, established by the New Zealand Government in 2003. This strategy, Larner argues, aimed to construct emigrants and their descendants as part of a community of knowledge-bearing subjects, as part of a neoliberal, globalizing project:
In the policy documents of a myriad of international organisations, national governments and economic development agencies, diaspora strategies are now an integral part of a governmental imaginary in which entrepreneurial, globally networked, subjects create new possibilities for economic growth and in doing so contribute to the development of a knowledge-based economy...in the case of New Zealand, diaspora strategies aim to mobilise and connect expatriate experts in the name of international connectedness, economic development, entrepreneurship, and innovation rather than trying to convince them to return home. (Larner 2007: 334)

As distinct from older emphases on stemming emigration and promoting return in order to combat loss of human capital, diaspora strategies reflect ‘new conceptions of human capital and national innovation systems’, which revolve around ‘accessing global economic networks by identifying and mobilising citizens who have multiple affiliations’ (p. 332). ‘Diaspora strategies’, Larner argues, ‘represent a new way of thinking about economies, populations and states’ (p. 342), and the New Zealand case is emblematic of diaspora strategies around the world.

In light of this broader significance, it is worthwhile re-examining the relationship between New Zealand’s neoliberal reforms and its re-orientation towards expatriates in greater depth, and asking to what extent the ‘diaspora strategy’ concept can explain the shift in New Zealand’s orientation towards expatriates under Labour between 1999 and 2008. This paper argues that the notion of a diaspora strategy, as currently framed, explains part, but not all, of the shift in question. Just as Larner originally intended, the concept aptly explains recent new ‘creative’ reforms to New Zealand’s institutions, which involved the ‘roll out’ of market-mimicking state initiatives, aimed at constituting expatriates as members of a loyal, business-friendly ‘diaspora’. However, the concept currently does not attempt to deal with the crucial issue of how neoliberalism transformed already existing institutional frameworks through which the New Zealand government related to expatriates. Focusing on the latter opens up a broader research agenda, aimed at understanding the overlooked relations between states and expatriates that have occurred (and are occurring) beyond the realm of liberalism.

2 Creative destruction in New Zealand’s ‘diaspora strategy’

The rhetorical shift between denouncing New Zealand expatriates as traitors and hailing them as heroes overlaid a complicated array of governmental programmes and initiatives between 1999 and 2008. This rhetoric and its underlying institutional manifestations must be understood in the context of the country’s prolonged neoliberal reforms.

New Zealand’s neoliberal adventure can be divided into two phases. It began in 1984, as the incoming Fourth Labour Government responded to a succession of post-colonial economic crises. Faced with a bankrupt state, Labour unleashed a wave of ‘roll-back neoliberal’ reforms (Peck and Tickell, 2002) that have their archetype in Thatcherism and Reaganism, focusing on state asset sales, welfare cuts, and economic deregulation (see below). This programme was entrenched by successive National Party governments between 1990 and 1999. At this point, after 15 years of destructive reform, New Zealand entered a more creative phase of neoliberal restructuring as the Labour Party came to power, promising to follow the more moderate ‘Third Way’ path blazed by Tony Blair and Bill Clinton during the 1990s. Rather than abnegating any role in economic planning,
government would offer streamlined support to markets, coaxing them into welfare-enhancing growth by nurturing their positive spin-offs and dampening their failures.

The shift in governmental orientation towards New Zealand expatriates took place at the point of overlap between these ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ phases of neoliberal reform, and thus reflects them. An increasingly inclusive and celebratory rhetoric concerning expatriates overlaid a creative process in which New Zealand’s political and economic elites crafted a range of market-oriented initiatives to ‘engage the diaspora’ for the country’s economic betterment. Larner’s concept of a ‘diaspora strategy’ gives great insight into this trend. However, the concept omits any mention of an intertwined ‘roll back’ process within New Zealand’s pre-existing diaspora policies. The earlier stance of denouncing expatriates overlaid a process of abandoning and dismantling inherited institutional frameworks for incorporating expatriates into the state as ‘external citizens’ (Baubock 2009). In particular, as discussed below, the bilateral agreements through which New Zealand had long ensured the social security coverage of New Zealanders in Australia were eroded and eventually cut entirely.²

2.1 Rolling out diaspora engagement

2.1.1 Emigration and its discontents

Figure 2: New Zealand’s Permanent and Long-Term Migration by Citizenship, 1971–2007

Source data: Statistics New Zealand, Tourism and Migration 2007, Table 9.01. Author’s analysis.

² The following discussion draws on analysis of interviews, media reports and official documents obtained under New Zealand’s Official Information Act. Interviews were conducted with some 190 policy makers, business leaders and migrants in eight locations (London, Sydney, Paris, Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, Wellington and Auckland) from late 2004 to mid 2009.
New Zealand’s diaspora has accumulated gradually through net outflows of New Zealand citizens since Britain withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1973, precipitating a long-term economic decline. Prior to this, New Zealand was thought of as a ‘classical migration-receiving country’ (Castles and Miller 2003: 7); afterwards, it sent large and increasing numbers of migrants. Between 1979 and 2006 there was an annual net emigration of 20,578 New Zealand citizens (see Gamlen, 2007: 12). As Figure 2 shows, a steady trickle of returning New Zealand citizens has not offset larger, more erratic surges of New Zealand-citizen emigration. Peaks of emigration occurred during the profound and prolonged economic shock that followed cutting economic ties to Britain in 1973; during the shock of neoliberal reforms in the mid-1980s, implemented as emergency measures to unburden the sinking economy; and during the resumption of the downward slide from the mid-1990s, when it became clear that these measures had been insufficient (also see Cately 2001). The imprint of what was once intra-imperial migration remains visible in the patterns of emigration from New Zealand: expatriates tend to be tertiary educated, young ‘rite of passage’ migrants, exploring ‘Anglo-world’ countries, much as middle-class and aristocratic British youth once undertook ‘Grand Tours’ of the European continent and British colonies in order to find their fortunes. New Zealand migration was thus, in a sense, both a symptom of the British Empire’s formal disintegration, and an indication of its enduring influence.

New Zealand elites remain deeply ambivalent about emigration: it is sometimes seen as a support to New Zealand’s strategic ties with global power centers, but other times it is perceived not only as a material loss but also a vote of no confidence in the status quo. Concerns over emigration became increasingly prominent during the 1990s, as public debate took aim at successive governments for failing to counteract, or worse still for causing, a relentless ‘brain drain’ of New Zealand citizens. The vitriol reached a peak in 2000, with the publication of a full-page advertisement in the New Zealand Herald, entitled ‘A Generation Lost?’ (see Appendix 1), blaming the Labour Government’s policies for the exodus of skilled young people. Although it later emerged that the ad had been financed by the left-leaning Government’s enemies on the Business Roundtable, the ad not only listed the names of 700 expatriates who shared its concerns, but also touched a nerve with the wider public, leading to enormous and sustained pressure on successive Governments to do something concrete about emigration. Such pressure has remained a prominent theme of public debate: current Prime Minister John Key argued as recently as 2007 (as then-Opposition Leader), ‘we’ve got a very, very significant brain drain issue and it’s one that the Government in a large part has been in denial over..... I think what they’ve done has caused it’ (Personal communication, 9 March 2007).

Partly owing to lack of an alternative approach, and partly in reflection of the ideological climate (as discussed more in the next section), governments from the late 1990s

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4 Figure 2 omits short-term mobility and breaks down gross permanent and long-term flows by citizenship for most of the post-Second World War period. I am very grateful to Richard Bedford for sharing the raw data for this graph.
increasingly highlighted the transnational connections of skilled expatriate New Zealanders as a silver lining to the perceived problem of emigration. The strength of expatriates’ transnational social ties has provided leaders with some optimism that they were not entirely lost to New Zealand society. According to expatriate businessman Chris Liddell (then Chief Financial Officer of Microsoft, now of General Motors), the diaspora could be ‘a relatively free resource which could have a relatively high impact if focused in the right fashion.’ (Personal communication, 13 December 2006). The question was how to focus or mobilize this resource given the loose organization and myriad ethnic and political divisions characterizing New Zealanders abroad. A post-colonial society, New Zealand had only relatively recently shifted from a bicultural pattern in which a white, British-oriented majority dominated an indigenous Māori minority, to a multicultural pattern in which new immigrant minorities had also begun to compete for political influence. Its national identity was relatively young and ‘fractured’ (Spoonley et al. 2003), and thus the question of mobilizing New Zealand expatriates for economic gain became bound up with the question of what it meant to be a New Zealander, and how senses of New Zealand identity could be fostered and ‘leveraged’ into tangible benefits offsetting brain drain.

2.1.2 The Growth and Innovation Framework

Many of New Zealand’s recent diaspora initiatives emerged from the Labour-led Government’s ‘Growth and Innovation Framework’ (GIF) (Office of the Prime Minister 2002), its grand strategy, announced in 2002, aimed at transforming New Zealand into a ‘knowledge economy’ and thereby reversing its post-colonial economic decline. GIF came into being through a process of re-negotiating the Government’s alliance with business elites, as part of an explicit ‘Third Way’ philosophy adopted by senior Labour figures, notably former academic sociologist Steve Maharey, then considered one of the Labour Party’s most influential political thinkers (Maharey 2003). Having campaigned on a platform of return to state intervention, retention of public assets, and full employment, the incoming Left-wing government soon set new terms for its relationship to business: hard-line government detractors of older generations, grown mighty in the years of deregulation, were marginalized (for example, the Prime Minister publicly called for the sacking of the chair of the Business Roundtable), while a new and younger ‘ginger group’ of business leaders was wooed through a charm offensive of smoked-salmon lunches, seminars and think shops with government ministers (Laugesen 2000; O’Sullivan 2000).

It was within the wider context of this business–government rapprochement, and the formulation of a wider strategy to cope with long-term economic decline, that the idea of harnessing the diaspora emerged. Though injected at various points into the dialogue, many remembered McKinsey and Company’s Andrew Grant, then Director of the New Zealand Office of Management Consultancy giant McKinsey and Company and a central figure on the business side of the ‘smoked salmon offensive’ (Laugesen 2000; O’Sullivan 2000), as one of this idea’s key proponents. As Grant explains, the idea was explicitly couched in terms of what was then an innovative ‘Third Way’ neoliberal approach, involving a more economically proactive role for the state:

New Zealand being a fairly small business community, there was a general feeling in I would say the late 90s...that New Zealand was really missing the boat...And also that we had a preoccupation with a certain set of policy prescriptions that had been very powerful, but to some extent had lost their power and had gone as far as was possible...
most of those ideas were shaped by the Friedmans and the Hayeks of the world, very much the neo-classical world view…. There was a feeling that really the intellectual force certainly from business had been the Business Roundtable, and…that the full solution space, or the full toolkit of ideas available to New Zealand, was not being deployed, but the relationship between business and government had actually become very adversarial…’I’m of a generation that was at high school when Muldoon was in power…The ‘don’t pick winners’, the [fear of] interventionism, and [of] the state having a more assertive strategic agenda, I think those are scars, that rightfully, the previous generation was very concerned about repeating. But for me, Muldoon is not foremost in my thinking, and I don’t want to be a reaction against Muldoon. That’s a long, long time ago. And I think many of us were also concerned that we were living in a post-Muldoon era where the world had moved on considerably…’It was nearly 20 years since Muldoon, and we should not have policy prescriptions that were still as it were influenced by those problematic policies.’ (Personal communication, 30 January 2007.) Using Ireland as an example of how the diaspora could be leveraged to increase flows of talent and foreign direct investment and thereby to boost economic growth, Grant and others put the case to government ministers that ‘we’re just not proactive enough around the New Zealand diaspora.’

We actually did have this little thing that we called ‘The Group’; we just got together in very informal place…a group of like minded individuals that got together and discussed their issues and had a bit of a ‘Save New Zealand’ agenda…We set up [a meeting] with Cabinet minus Helen [Clark, the Prime Minister… Basically we framed it as saying ‘we don’t like the relationship business has with government today’…Secondly, we actually do think there’s a new toolkit that can be deployed…We gave the example around the war for talent, and gave some examples of what Ireland, for example, and Israel were doing around talent…the whole notion of the diaspora…was introduced by one of my Irish colleagues who said, ‘listen we did a fantastic job of really leveraging the Irish diaspora and actually in Ireland we put together a plan to see who were the 100 most influential expat Irish…and then called them or wrote them or had Mary, the President, call them or write them. And basically the line was ‘what have you done for Ireland lately?’ (Personal communication, 30 January 2007.)

Chris Liddell, another ‘new generation’ CEO linked to the Group, explained:

...there’s out to a million [expatriates] outside of New Zealand, and a reasonable proportion of those still have an interest in New Zealand. Generally speaking they’re all reasonably talented people, reasonably wealthy to some degree – they represent a resource … an asset for New Zealand if you like, which is reasonably intelligent and got some resources and they’re willing to contribute to New Zealand. They’re also not a drain on New Zealand, so it’s a relatively free resource which could have a relatively high impact if focused in the right fashion. (Personal communication, 13 December 2006)

The smoked-salmon offensive culminated in a three-day conference in August 2001, conceived and launched by then-Auckland University Vice-Chancellor John Hood and the Prime Minister under the banner ‘Catching the Knowledge Wave’. The conference aimed ‘to involve a broad cross section of the community in informed debate about future directions for New Zealand’ (Clark 2001; Hood 2001). Around 450 participants registered, among them some 30 international leaders in the fields of business, politics and academia (O’Sullivan 2001a; 2001b).
The idea of engaging the diaspora caught on and became a prominent talking point. Co-convener John Hood called on the conference to engage ‘members of the Kiwi Diaspora’ in developing a vision of New Zealand’s path to prosperity. Historian James Belich questioned whether the diaspora was ‘a brain drain or... a New Zealand world-wide web, a well-placed global network ready to help New Zealand’ (Belich 2001). Expatriate scientist Jilly Evans pleaded, to rapturous applause, for New Zealand to ‘reincorporate [skilled New Zealanders] into the fabric of the New Zealand society...Like a reverse brain gain’ (Evans 2001). London School of Economics Professor Robert Wade recommended the formulation and coordination of ‘diaspora policy’ by the Ministry of Science and Technology (Wade 2001), while Berkley business Professor David Teece argued that New Zealand should ‘harness the expatriates’, beginning with attempts to trace them through a comprehensive database of names managed by a not-for-profit entity (Teece 2001). Along with retail magnate Stephen Tindall, Teece seized the moment by announcing the founding of the Kiwi Expats Association – an idea the two philanthropists had come up with during a tea break at the conference. The Association, which would come to be called ‘Kea’ for short, would be established with seed funds of NZ$100,000 each from the founders’ own pockets.5

By 2001, key figures in the Government had begun to embrace the idea of recasting brain drain as a potential gain, and the idea found a place within the Budget with the backing of Deputy Prime Minister Jim Anderton:

[T]he most exciting parts of the budget were those in the economic development area targeted at the diaspora, those New Zealanders who no longer live in their own country. The key programme I announced is called ‘World Class New Zealanders’, and is a ‘brain gain’ initiative designed to identify and network with New Zealanders who are world class thinkers. This ... initiative [is] aimed at lifting the level of business expertise in New Zealand, sharing innovative ideas and exposing New Zealanders to international best practice. It will expand the availability of world class technology and help to attract new investment to New Zealand. I want to see more profile for role models and examples of Kiwis as world leaders for our young people. Real and virtual networks will use existing business connections and New Zealanders overseas to access international markets and promote New Zealand. (Anderton 2001)

This approach was to precipitate two main initiatives: the private-sector led Kiwi Expats Association, which was later to become the publicly funded Kea New Zealand, and a ‘World Class New Zealand’ programme within the operational arm of Anderton’s own Ministry of Economic Development.

2.1.3 The World Class New Zealand Programme

Initially, the two main pillars of the World Class New Zealand Programme were its International Business Exchanges and its Business Growth Service. The Business Growth Service aimed to assist businesses with significant growth prospects by offering guidance and know-how backed up with grants of up to NZ$100,000.6 The Exchanges involved funding and facilitating visits between expatriates (plus high-flying ‘friends of New Zealand’) and New Zealand firms, in order to provide ‘entrepreneurs and high growth New Zealand industries and businesses the opportunity to learn from the world’s best companies and

5 Stephen Tindall, Personal communication, 12 March 2007.
Initially the spotlight was on the ICT sector, but it broadened to include innovations across a wider range of sectors.

Eventually, however, the focus of the programme was to shift towards the World Class New Zealand Awards and the World Class New Zealand Network, managed by Kea. A central goal of the World Class New Zealand programme was to celebrate the successes of talented New Zealanders through an awards scheme. Jointly convened by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Kea, the World Class New Zealand Awards aimed to ‘recognise an expatriate who has made an outstanding contribution to New Zealand’s economic development, by actively assisting New Zealand industry and building our global connections.’ After its establishment in 2003, the initiative gradually grew and shifted focus. One award in 2003 grew to seven in 2006, each targeted at key players in strategically important sectors identified by the Government: Information and Communications Technology; Creative Industries; Biotechnology; Manufacturing; Research, Science, Technology and Academia; and Finance, Investment and Business Services. A lavish ceremony developed around the Awards, involving television personalities, speeches from the prime minister, and a black-tie dinner for the Who’s Who of New Zealand business and politics.

The winners of the World Class New Zealand Awards were considered the top tier of a wider pool of influential expatriate movers and shakers who the programme identifies as being capable of making a difference. This wider pool forms the World Class New Zealand Network – ‘a global network of New Zealanders and “New Zealand-friendly” industry experts committed to helping New Zealand’s development, international competitiveness and economic growth’. The invitation criteria are for individuals who have achieved global success, have contributed to New Zealand’s development or have the potential to contribute by engaging with the network, and have the willingness to provide time and advice to contribute towards New Zealand’s growth. The Network is managed by a full-time staff member in New Zealand, who fosters relationships and identifies synergies between members where potential collaborations may lead to benefits to New Zealand. The Network revolves around regular in-person summits; in 2008 these were held in Auckland, London and New York. The summits entailed discussions both around the role and possible contribution of members, and around the creation of a 20-year vision for New Zealand. Feedback and discussions were compiled and delivered to government ministers, though it is uncertain to what extent these were taken on board.

2.1.4 Kea New Zealand

The World Class New Zealand Awards and Network were delivered by Kea New Zealand, a public–private partnership initiated by expatriate business academic David Teece and philanthropist Stephen Tindall as a closing action point to the 2001 Knowledge Wave Conference. Teece and Tindall began by organizing affluent, influential and enthusiastic expatriates in key regions into volunteer local ‘chapters’, alongside an online database of

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7 Ibid.
some 5,000 expatriates. Branding itself as ‘New Zealand’s Global Talent Community’, the organization soon began attracting project and seed funding from a range of government agencies (including its contract to deliver the World Class New Zealand Awards), allowing it to enhance its web presence and employ more staff.

Notwithstanding considerable ups and downs, Kea expanded massively through the 2000s. The organization’s membership multiplied dramatically with its 2006 ‘Every One Counts’ survey of expatriates, which was billed as a ‘global census’, piggy-backing on the publicity surrounding the New Zealand national census and playing up patriotic loyalties in order to reach some 18,000 respondents in around 155 countries, many of whom gave permission for their details to be stored in the online database (see Appendix 2 for data map).\(^1\) Funded by a range of corporate and bureaucratic backers, Every One Counts (EOC) took the form of an online survey sent out through a hyperlink in a viral email. The email announced: ‘Kea New Zealand has launched the first global census of expatriate New Zealanders – Every One Counts – aimed at tracking down the estimated one million Kiwis living overseas...When you fill in the survey, and when you refer friends and family... you are automatically eligible to win a range of prizes, including All Black test tickets...’. As a marketing campaign for its parent organization, Every One Counts (EOC) was a huge success. As responses surged in they were counted on a digital map on the Kea webpage, decked out in the black and white colours of New Zealand’s national rugby team and the aqua blue of the national airline, and indicating the number of survey responses from New Zealanders on each continent, alongside the slogan ‘New Zealand is bigger than it looks’. Through this initiative, then, Kea and its backers hoped to encourage people – including expatriates themselves – to think of New Zealanders abroad as part of the ‘national’ population, with New Zealand’s economic interests at heart. At the same time, they hoped to make this population more knowable and therefore governable.

Some of its subsequent initiatives were less successful, leading to criticism of the organization for over-reaching: an evaluation of Kea in early 2009 found that even though Kea had reached the critical mass to make a contribution to New Zealand (Moore and van der Scheer 2009), ‘services such as an employment website and a mentoring program have been less than successful’ (Moore and van der Scheer 2009: i), and that ‘there is a real risk (legally and reputationally) in Kea independently entering into anything but a light-touch approach to service delivery without a great deal of thought and careful planning’ (Moore

\(^1\) The Every One Counts survey results not only provide perhaps the largest and most detailed quantitative survey to be made of any diaspora anywhere, but also reveal a great deal about the kind of ‘diaspora’ that New Zealand was both discovering and constituting in the period in question. The survey data has a number of specific strengths. First, despite being based on a non-random ‘snowball’ sample which prevent the results from being generalized to all New Zealand expatriates, the dataset is large enough to allow comparison between subgroups of the sample (Fursman 2010). Second, it provides individual-level micro-data not only on the demographic characteristics of a large number of expatriates, but also on the nature and extent of their transnational connections to their home country. Third, although the survey sacrificed statistical reliability by using self-identification as an expatriate as a measure of diaspora, rather than on the measure of birthplace that is used in national censuses, it is important to recognize that it gains some statistical validity because self-identification is more central to the concept of diaspora than is birthplace. Not all New Zealand-born expatriates identify and connect to New Zealand, and some people born outside New Zealand, such as spouses and descendants of expatriates, may strongly identify with New Zealand – particularly those for whom belonging is defined by ancestry, which is the case for many indigenous Māori people, for example.
and van der Scheer 2009: iv). Such assessments chimed with ambivalence at the highest levels of Government over the concept of public support for Kea – an ambivalence which reflected both a by-then habitual regulatory reticence, and at the same time an increasing openness to market-friendly policy innovations. This attitude came through clearly in an interview with Anderton’s successor as Economic Development Minister, Trevor Mallard, in early 2007:

Half of me thinks, well this is a really good thing for New Zealand companies, why can’t they fund it all? I think part of the problem is around just the inability of individual companies to really capture the value. There’s something where the whole is worth more than the sum of the parts. And the value doesn’t necessarily accrue to the people who are making the investment. And I think that’s where some of the role of government is. (Personal communication, 8 March 2007)

Soon after these comments were made, Mallard injected a further NZ$1.8 million three-year grant into Kea, effectively doubling the Government’s rate of contribution to the organization. Kea scored another success with its campaign to increase expatriate voter enrolments during the run-up to the 2008 New Zealand General Election. Using the name ‘Every Vote Counts’, the campaign drew on the successful ‘Every One Counts’ brand, as well as its winning strategy of tying into a major public event. Within four days of the campaign launch, the number of people checking their enrolment details online had quadrupled, and about a third of all hits on the official elections website were coming from overseas.11 Although expatriate votes had a limited impact on the election results (see Table 1), Every Vote Counts successfully conveyed Kea’s central message: that the diaspora should be recognized as a powerful part of New Zealand society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Effective %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Effective %</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Effective %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>157,613</td>
<td>7.19%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4,487</td>
<td>14.19%</td>
<td>153,126</td>
<td>7.09%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>796,880</td>
<td>36.37%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8,782</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
<td>788,098</td>
<td>36.49%</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>1,053,398</td>
<td>48.08%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16,548</td>
<td>52.34%</td>
<td>1,036,850</td>
<td>48.01%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other parties</td>
<td>336,675</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>5.69%</td>
<td>334,031</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2,344,566</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>32,461</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>2,312,105</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table by Kea New Zealand. Used with permission.

2.2 Rolling back external citizenship

These policy innovations of the 2000s fit well within Larner’s ‘diaspora strategy’ framework, but it is also essential to recognize that the rhetoric of ‘engaging the diaspora’ followed hard on the heels of – and indeed in certain respects overlapped with – another dynamic involving the destruction of New Zealand’s older, inherited institutional frameworks for interacting with expatriates. This too was part of the neoliberal reform process, but part of a different and earlier current from the changes that took place under the ‘Third Way’ banner. In order to understand this contrasting current, it is necessary to look back to the start of New Zealand’s neoliberal adventure, in 1984.

Responding to the devastating second oil shock of 1979, then-Prime Minister and Finance Minister Robert Muldoon had launched a raft of large-scale infrastructure projects financed by heavy public borrowing, dubbed ‘Think Big’. By 1983 he was fighting deep indebtedness and inflation around 15 per cent, by means of a wage and price freeze (Russell 1996: 43), which in turn sparked a run on the overvalued currency (Russell 1996: 54). Within five days of Muldoon’s electoral defeat in 1984, the new Labour Government’s Finance Minister Roger Douglas announced, to a public largely unaware of the crisis, that the New Zealand dollar would be devalued by 20 per cent.

This was but the first shot in a 15-year barrage of roll-back neoliberal reforms to open the economy and shrink the state. Capital controls were lifted, trade was liberalized through removal of tariffs and subsidies, and independent monetary controls were eventually imposed. State assets were privatized at fire-sale rates: between 1987 and 2001, 40 state commercial assets were sold for around $19 billion, many to offshore investors (Goulter 2001), and the remaining state sector was radically overhauled in line with private-sector management principles (Boston 1991). The then-State Services Commissioner remembers eliminating ‘95 per cent of the public service manual in the space of two or three months’. New Zealand ‘went from being the most regulated in the developed world to being the least regulated’ (Roger Douglas quoted in Russell 1996: 80), and Foreign Direct Investment increased 400 per cent from $9.7 billion in 1989 to $52.5 billion in 2003 (Cronin n.d.).

The question of welfare reform divided and ultimately brought down the Government in the 1990 election. Forestalled by Labour, welfare cuts were followed up with vengeance by the fourth National Government. The labour market was deregulated, undermining the trade unions; welfare benefits were reduced by $1.3 billion (1.7 per cent of GDP) (Conway 2002: 4); market rents were introduced to state housing; fees were introduced in hospitals and universities; and an unpopular surcharge on pensions was retained in spite of election promises to the contrary.

The neoliberals’ hunt for ‘resilient pockets of the old regime lurking in undiscovered and half-forgotten corners’ of the state system (Russell 1996: 114) continued beyond the National Government’s defeat by Labour in 1999, which signalled the beginning of a creative ‘roll out’ phase inspired by ‘Third Way’ thinking. As discussed below, this climate of cutbacks and austerity infused the Government’s attitude towards New Zealand’s institutional frameworks for dealing with expatriates, in the form of its international social security agreements.
2.2.1 The Trans-Tasman Free Travel Arrangement

Changes to New Zealand’s international social security agreements must on the one hand be seen in the context of the persistent paring back and ‘targeting’ of social security entitlements that characterized the country’s ‘roll back’ neoliberal period. On the other hand, they must be understood as part of the wider geopolitical process of drift from Britain that underpinned New Zealand’s long-term economic decline and set in chain its drastic neoliberal response. These shifts involved fundamental transformations in citizenship and sovereignty in New Zealand and across the British Commonwealth.

During the middle years of the twentieth century, the form and content of citizenship both fragmented and expanded for most New Zealanders. With the British Nationality Act of 1948, the expansive status of British Subjecthood, which had applied across the disintegrating British Empire Realm, fragmented into a range of more restrictive national citizenships applying in particular to former colonies. Meanwhile, the entitlements attached to the status of British Subject and its successor citizenships expanded rapidly in step with the growth of welfare states across the industrialized world.

These two processes shaped migration between New Zealand and Australia at least until the late 1970s. Traditional free trans-Tasman migration and seamless access to growing welfare benefits at either end were formalized first through a reciprocal social security agreement in 1948, and then through the 1973 Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement. Although this bilateral arrangement between New Zealand and Australia covered but a fragment of former British territory, at its height it confirmed and consolidated within this limited area a level of interstate cohesion that the wider British Empire had never been able to fully achieve, guaranteeing not only free movement but also full and seamless social welfare coverage between the two countries.

However, from the 1980s, this island of intra-Commonwealth free movement also began to erode as welfare states rolled back and post-colonial trans-Tasman relations adjusted. In 1973 Britain broke from the Commonwealth and joined the European Economic Community, closing off a major market for antipodean exports and catalyzing a profound economic crisis that New Zealand governments of the 1980s attempted to address through a radical neoliberal programme of privatization, de-regulation and slashes to welfare funding. Emigration to Australia reached unprecedented levels and became a concern to both countries: New Zealand worried that the outflows represented both a ‘brain drain’ and vote of no confidence, while Australia worried about the welfare bill for increasing numbers of New Zealand immigrants.

Although nominally imposed by Australia, the resulting restrictions on trans-Tasman welfare portability were to some extent the result of mutual assent. In 1986 and 1994 stand-down periods for Australian benefits were introduced alongside a reimbursement scheme whereby New Zealand paid for some of ‘its’ beneficiaries in Australia. Matters came to a head when the New Zealand government refused Australia’s requests to pay a larger share. Australia responded by withdrawing New Zealanders’ special automatic access

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to welfare coverage on arrival. Commentators noted that New Zealand saw significant interests served by the change, even though New Zealand’s negotiators nominally resisted it (see Birrell and Rapson 2001; Bedford et al. 2003; Sanderson 2009). Unrestricted movement would continue between the two countries as part of efforts to maintain a ‘Single Economic Market’, but migrants would no longer be protected by a welfare safety net (Birrell and Rapson 2001: 61; Sanderson 2009). In an era of public cut-backs and market de-regulation, the entitlements of expatriate New Zealanders were low on the list of government priorities.

### 2.2.2 Pension portability

However, it was not always the case that fiscal conservatism coincided with a primary concern for territorial residents: sometimes the two agendas conflicted, as in the case of pension portability, which underwent a seven-year review between 2001 and 2008. On the one hand, officials urged political leaders to reform the portability system in order to achieve greater administrative efficiency and substantial fiscal savings. The essence of their proposals was to reform the defined-benefit state pension scheme that had been designed without portability in mind, and as a result had come to arbitrarily discriminate against emigrants in a variety of ways. They proposed to replace this system with a defined-contribution system allowing greater international portability of individual entitlements. On the other hand, politicians were afraid of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, by abandoning a pension system that worked for most of their voting constituents, in order to make life easier for a minority of migrants. Reform proposals were rejected, leaving in place an internationally frowned-upon policy through which the New Zealand Government confiscates overseas pension entitlements from New Zealand superannuitants, and places restrictions on their ability to apply for their New Zealand entitlements from abroad. In this case, fiscal conservatism per se was not the only justification for restricting the entitlements of emigrants; politicians wanted to ensure that the pension system favoured life-long New Zealand residents over migrants, even if such a system ended up less administratively efficient and more expensive than the more portable alternatives.

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Conclusions

New Zealand was for much of its existence part of a unitary empire, within which flows of people, goods, money and ideas that are now considered international were once thought of as essentially internal. The pathways travelled by diasporic New Zealanders are still largely determined by these older patterns, but the volumes of flows travelling these pathways are driven by the economic trauma caused by the fracturing of this unitary system. The same trauma has led New Zealand to fundamentally rethink the terms on which it engages with the wider world, prompting a prolonged and profound period of neoliberal restructuring, affecting emigration policy along with everything else.

New Zealand’s neoliberal reforms have taken place in two phases. A roll-back phase unfolded from 1984 to 1999, involving the destruction and dismantling of pre-existing institutional frameworks through welfare cut-backs, privatization of state assets, and economic de-regulation. Although elements of this trend persisted after 1999, this point marked a shift towards roll-out, ‘Third Way’ neoliberalism, aimed at supporting market-led growth through creative new market-friendly policy programmes. This two-phase process is reflected in shifts in government orientation towards New Zealand expatriates between 1999 and 2008. The tail-end of roll-back neoliberal restructuring is evident in the constriction of external citizenship entitlements for New Zealanders in Australia, at the same time as roll-out neoliberal reforms began to appear in the form of what might be thought of as a ‘diaspora strategy’ aimed at constituting expatriate New Zealanders as part of a ‘global talent community’, loyal to their homeland and dedicated to its economic advancement.

Larner’s concept of a ‘diaspora strategy’ is a powerful tool for understanding the latter part of this process: it helps to explain ‘new’ rhetoric and policies that emerged in the period in question, and in doing so emphasizes – along similar lines to Natasha Iskander – the creative aspects of states policies towards emigration in recent years (Iskander 2010). However, there is also a destructive aspect to neoliberal state reforms. As currently framed, the diaspora strategy concept – like Iskander’s concept of a ‘creative state’ – has little to say about the ‘old’ rhetoric and policy that emerged as part of this destructive ‘roll-back’ phase of neoliberal transformation. By highlighting how New Zealand’s new diaspora strategies emerged from the latter part of a longer-term process of neoliberal state restructuring, we can begin not only to understand the shift between old and new governmental orientations towards expatriates, but also – crucially – to understand how neoliberalism transformed what the state was already doing as far as expatriates were concerned.

This reframing has two significant implications for understanding the relationship between diasporas and transnationalism on the one hand and neoliberalization on the other. First, by examining the process of institutional creation and destruction in state–diaspora relations, this kind of analysis highlights overlooked modes of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, where the revolutionary ideology of market-based state restructuring meets the messy evolutionary process of institutional transformation. This uneven process of transformation can give rise to sudden and surprising shifts in governing discourses and practices, such as the shift from a gradual process of ‘rolling back’ inherited institutional frameworks around expatriate membership, towards ‘rolling out’ new programmes that recast such membership in market-friendly terms. The potential usefulness of this approach
is clearly evident in the large number of unexplained governmental shifts in orientation towards expatriates around the world. As currently framed, the diaspora strategy concept explains the orientation governments are switching to, but not the orientation they have switched from. There is no better way to build on the diaspora strategy concept more broadly, than to address the New Zealand case in which it was originally grounded.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, this analysis opens up a wider research agenda to reveal, understand and explain aspects of the state that have long existed but have been overlooked by ‘methodologically nationalistic’ or ‘modern geopolitical’ ways of thinking about the world in terms of discrete, territorially sealed nation-state units (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 2003; Agnew 2003; Murphy 1996). In acknowledging that there was already an institutional ecosystem pertaining to expatriates in place by the time ‘diaspora strategies’ came into the picture, one is confronted by the possibility that similar ecosystems are inherent to the nation-state form. I have shown elsewhere through macro-level cross-national comparative research that such ecosystems, which I refer to as ‘emigration state’ systems, can be found in an unexpectedly broad range of states, and have often been in operation for a long time (Gamlen 2008). Other case studies also suggest that diaspora policies, for example in Mexico, have a long pre-neoliberal history (Cano and Délano 2007; Fitzgerald 2006; Sherman 1999).

Thus, on the one hand, the study in this paper forces us to disaggregate our understanding of the globalization of state processes from processes of neoliberalism: rather than seeing the two as effectively synonymous, we should see the latter as the most recent manifestation of the former. On the other hand, this study of the New Zealand case adds weight to the proposition that institutionalized state–diaspora relations should be regarded as regular rather than contingent forms of political organization, suggesting a need to re-examine the notion that ‘diaspora strategies represent a new way of thinking about economies, populations and states’ (Larner 2007: 342). States everywhere have long been spilling messily beyond their own borders in pursuit of populations: we need to revise our understanding of the modern nation-state in order to account for this.
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Appendix 1: Richard Poole’s ‘Generation Lost’ advertisement, 2000
