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Undermining the ‘Local’: Migration, Development and Gold in Kayes

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In the summer of 2009, popular protests erupted in Djidjan, a gold-mining town in the southern part of Mali’s westernmost region, Kayes. Mine activities stopped for three days, costing millions of dollars in production; property of the Loulo gold mine was destroyed, including machines and company housing for expatriates; vehicles of gendarmes were burned; and in the end several dozen people were hospitalized and more than 90 imprisoned by government security forces for at least two months – some up to a year without trial. In the protests’ wake, a rumor circulated that the mine’s Malian director would be replaced because of instability and insecurity. Inhabitants of Djidjan and neighboring villages rejoiced. One association of youth from Mahina, a city in eastern Kayes, held a public celebration, and many – mine employees, their family members, the unemployed who had come looking to work in the mine, merchants and farmers – expressed the hope that the next mine director would be a toubab (white person).

For those trained to cringe at outside governing of postcolonial Africa the call by residents of Djidjan for foreign leadership of the most significant local governing body – indeed, the Loulo gold mine is the largest employer and sponsor of public works, and finances local police, education and health services – should give pause. Does one read into this a contemporary manifestation of a Fanonian psychological complex? Or is it a condemnation of African leadership, and an endorsement of a very literal re-colonization, as certain economists brazenly advocate?

On the contrary, this call for foreign governance in Djidjan has less to do with subordination than with a rejection of it. First and foremost it is a rejection of the subordination that comes of an identification with ‘development.’ For more than a half-century, a discursive complex has fashioned a conception of southern Kayes – as with much of Africa – as a rural development space. The image is recognizable: southern Kayes and its people are poor, agrarian, self-subsistent, isolated, and immobile (geographically and socially), though good candidates for development if only natural resources could be ‘properly’ exploited. This image has justified countless interventions into the land of Kayes and into the lives of Kayesians by governments, multinational mining corporations, and the development industry of aid agencies and financial institutions ostensibly seeking the bright green lights of development: agricultural sustainability and food security, coupled with profitable industrial output. But more importantly, the image of a developing Kayes has also empowered a distant, ineffective government, and disenfranchised those in Kayes from democratic control over extraction of their most valuable natural resource – gold. If it is because of ‘underdevelopment’ that Kayesians are excluded from the world where official decisions are made about their resources, then their call becomes intelligible as a connection to that world, and a rejection of the one being ‘developed.’

Many scholars have shown in great detail that discourses about Africa have meaningful, practical effects on the lives of Africans. But as Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard remind us, “the point is not to decide whether or not development discourse is truly hegemonic, but to examine projects of building and fracturing hegemonies” (1997, 13). This paper begins by examining how development discourse has made of southern Kayes an incarcerating space – where geographic and social mobility are viewed as unnatural or “pathological” (Malkki 1992, 31) – in order to reinforce government power and justify deplorable conditions of extracting gold, the country’s largest single source of export wealth. Next, it shows how migration within and out of Kayes radically threatens the idea of Kayes and Kayesians as a ‘developing’ space and people, by challenging
repressive government power through a political order that relies on mobility and connection to the 'outside' world at large. Finally, it engages scholarly work on migration from Kayes, which reinforces the powerful development image and depoliticizes the act of migration and the interactions between migrants and non-migrants 'back home.'

Imagining Kayes

Since Mali gained independence, Kenièba – the southernmost district of Kayes, where two of the region’s four industrial gold mines are located – has been a stage for development interventions that lean heavily on improbable notions of an essential ethnic culture (Malinké), rooted to the locale and disposed to sedentary agricultural life. Under the government of Modibo Keïta, early interventions were intimately linked to the single-party state’s efforts to present itself as the leader of development, and as the legitimate mediation between ‘isolated’ locales and the exterior world. But the US-RDA, the party of the first national government, faced a difficult task: stopping orpailleage and the migratory tendencies of orpailleurs, who made a hash of rural development plans aimed at increasing agricultural production.7

Less than two years after independence, at an assembly in Bamako in 1962, a report by the Kenièba section of the US-RDA laid out powerful image of southern Kayes:

“... needless to tell you that the inhabitants are poor. This poverty is, again, because of the fact that the colonialist, in the economic domain, concentrated on mineral research, leaving agriculture in the background. If it is true that the region’s soil is rich, we, local officials, have opted for agriculture”

because the region’s Malinké are “normally great cultivators” (ANM 1962, 4). The ideological and political motivations of a statement like this are clear. Party officials wanted to show a rupture with the French colonial administration; to show that the national party effectively represented the will of ‘local’ citizens far and wide; and to show that the national-socialist ideology of agricultural-led development was well received. To these ends, orpailleage appeared as an easy target. Besides being linked to colonial interest in the region (French efforts at gold mining were in fact minimal, due to the belief that deposits were spread too thinly to be profitable), orpailleage and the seasonal migration involved in it could be blamed for poor agricultural output. Party representatives from Kenièba announced at this time campaigns to emphasize agriculture “to the detriment of orpailleage” (ibid.).

These campaigns were largely frustrated. The US-RDA section of Kenièba was not able to convince ‘locals’ that it was in their nature and best interest to farm year round, to ignore gold mining, and to stay in one place. In 1963, it had to take repressive measures, announcing that “the exodus of the peasantry towards Senegal is formally forbidden... by government decision, all gold mines will be closed beginning at the end of May.” Party
officials had so much trouble enforcing these rules that they had to hire “vigilance brigades” (ANM 1963).

The essential image of residents of Kenièba as isolated, immobile, and agricultural became increasingly difficult to maintain. In the US-RDA’s reports to Bamako, “this population, which has for a long time suffered from isolation because of the absence of all-season roads, and because of the abandonment of agriculture in favor of orpaillage, is transforming itself since national independence, renewing its life” (ANM, 196-).

But internally, the Kenièba party representatives had trouble recruiting students because of insufficient food in schools and because of their absence, due to “orpaillage... for many years their principle occupation” (ANM, 196-(a)). US-RDA investigators later found that Malians from Kenièba were working in Senegalese gold mines and exchanging Malian francs for Senegalese currency – a major problem for a government who tried to forge a new path by inventing its own currency and turning away from recently-seceded Senegal and the rest of the French Community (ANM (196-(b)). As late as 1966, the US-RDA still blamed Kayes’s economic weakness on the colonizer’s obsession with gold mining, which, according to them, transformed farmers into miners and set agricultural production back.

The power of ‘local officials’ of the unique state party was by no means a given. Networks of merchants resisted policies of price regulation; production goals for communal farms were perennially hopeful due to abandonment by workers; and ‘locals’ continued to exploit the economic activities precisely forbidden them. Tying people to farm life was at best hopeful, for orpaillage depended upon mobility – locating a mine site, finding and transporting materials and resources for camps of diggers, refining, selling to networks of buyers from Bamako, Dakar and elsewhere – and contained the dream of ‘striking it big’ that agriculture did not.

In the face of evidence to the contrary, a powerful image of an isolated, immobile, and agricultural southern Kayes remained intact. It had been designated a place of poverty – in spite of the riches beneath its surface – and inexorably linked to a development picture that preferred people to stay ‘at home’ and to use the land in a particular way. Orpaillage and migration (seasonal and otherwise) were viewed as foreign-introduced pathologies that made any Malinké who practiced them ‘archaic’ or ‘backwards.’ This backwardness justified repressive – if ineffective – attempts at social engineering by a national government that wanted to reassert its legitimacy at a time when it was anything but stable. According to this politically powerful image of Kayes, Kayesians were not of a world where mobility in search of material welfare was natural or good. They became defined by the remedies that would ‘develop’ the space in which they resided.

The same disjuncture between the image of a sedentary, agricultural population in southern Kayes and the problems cited for its poverty remained strong throughout subsequent governments. During the authoritarian regime of Moussa Traore, announcements were broadcast before the agricultural season telling Kayesians that orpaillage was banned, though during this time there was in fact an upswing in artisanal mining. Populations reacted against exorbitant taxes that the government hoped would curb the practice. In Baboto – a village founded by orpailleurs – a gendarme was murdered in the late 1980s over just such tax disputes.
As late as 2006, a project of the national government’s Food Security Commissariat and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) investigated the causes of food shortage in Sitakily, the commune within Kenièba that houses the two southernmost gold mines. In their report, the area is presented as a place where “production does not cover food needs” (CSA 2006, 3) – a problematic that contains the assumption that this space should be self-sufficient in food – and the causes immediately cited place the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of autochthones: the “availability of labor,” due in turn to “the practice of orpaillage in winter,” to “the flight of potential labor,” and to “laziness” (6-7). In spite of the fact that the most likely cause of food shortage had nothing to do with the ‘local’ population in and of itself – populations had dramatically increased in the few years preceding the report, due to the opening of two industrial gold mines (Loulo and Tabakoto) that attracted laborers from all over West Africa in search of salaried work, putting pressure on food supplies – autochthones and their economic strategies were identified as the problem. ‘Locals’ were held as a particular case, and their problems disconnected from the world outside.

The idealized image of an agricultural, uneducated, and isolated population has been fundamental to the Malian government’s efforts to keep villagers of southern Kayes and the region’s industrial gold mining operations in diametric opposition. At the same time that the two worlds are conceptually separated – local/cosmopolitan, immobile/mobile, agrarian/industrial, traditional/modern – the government invokes its authority to mediate between them: it both knows what is best for its developing populations, and possesses the requisite knowhow and resources to negotiate with a powerful, multinational industry. Through a national government agency (the National Institute of Geology and of Mines), the government of Mali exercises the exclusive right to negotiate mining contracts, and does so without consultation from the villages that will be affected (displaced, often) by mining activities. It distributes land and the villages on it to foreign mining companies by invoking eminent domain – its heightened interests in, and knowledge of, the ‘national good.’ The government also upholds a physical metaphor for its status as intermediary. Every industrial mining ventures is a priori 20% owned by the Malian government, and its security forces patrol the border between the village and the mining company, its equipment, its expatriate workers and the company housing built for them. And these agents of security have been put to use. At every mine in Kayes, popular protests in neighboring villages (mostly youth or women’s associations protesting the lack of jobs or the poor quality of life – especially the lack of potable water) have been met with varying degrees of state repression. Though the majority of participants in each mobilization were from villages neighboring the mine permits, government officials have presented unrest as a problem provoked by ‘foreigners.’ In this way the Malian state maintains its position as the supreme benefactor and protector of the developing space, at the same time that it violently silences the most conspicuous expression of ‘local’ grievances. This is a profitable position. By separating the ‘developing’ world from the mining world, ‘development’ is separated from sticky questions about democratic control over resource extraction and the distribution of wealth. Development happens ‘out there’; industrial work, ‘in here.’

In Djidjan, as in all Malian towns where there is an industrial gold mine, the Malian government tried to head off the problem early by telling residents, at the mine’s inauguration, to maintain their ‘traditional’ ways of life. Information campaigns were
waged to inform ‘locals’ not to stop farming in favor of salaried employment at the mines, and not to disturb the ‘foreigners’ who would come to work. This practice began with the first industrial goldmine opened in Mali after the democratic revolution of 1991, Sadiola, where then-president Alpha Oumar Konaré made a speech to populations instructing them not to give up agriculture, and not to look for work in the mine where ‘qualified’ workers were needed. Before mining operations even began, the people of southern Kayes – ‘agricultural’ and uneducated in the ways of industrial work – were linked in official discourse to particular comportments and abilities that justified their exclusion from much sought-after salaried jobs of the mine.

While notables (‘locals’ or ‘natives’) have been able to find jobs at the gold mines of southern Kayes – albeit with a great deal of effort and protest – their identification with the development space still haunts them. In a recent strike by workers at the Loulo underground mine, management went to village chiefs to convince them to tell notables who work in the mine not to participate. Management said that the strike was provoked by foreign workers migrated from elsewhere in Mali and West Africa, and concerned them alone. But notables who work at the underground mine refused categorization as something apart, and maintained solidarity with other strikers. Since then, management has turned the tables, now considering notables the problem. They were specifically targeted during the violent suppression of protests in the summer of 2009, since which time it has been difficult for them to find stable, salaried work at the mine. Today – contrary to public pronouncements – there is a widespread, tacit policy of discrimination against workers for the simple virtue of their originating from the mining zone.

But development discourse is malleable, and residents of southern Kayes are not the only group susceptible to its applications. Indeed, the Malian government and mining companies have long justified discrimination against the entire African manual labor force at gold mines by citing the special needs of ‘developing’ places and peoples.

An official policy of ‘Malianization’ plans for the gradual replacement of mines’ expatriate staff by Malian employees. This translates uniquely into management, as mining – a capital-intensive activity – employs a relatively small work force, and West Africans (mostly Malian) have filled the hard-labor positions from the very beginning. It also directly merges the national government and mining operations by placing politically connected figures into management positions, helping the government to maintain its role as mediator between populations and foreign companies. The call by Djidjan’s inhabitants for a ‘toubab’ replacement of the Malian director (himself a product of Malianization) was a rejection of this role, as well as a call for direct dialogue with the mining companies. Thus, although Malianization is ostensibly designed to include the Malian population in the profits of mine work, it reintroduces difference by suggesting that a different kind of leadership is needed to deal with the ‘different’ Malian population. In this way, it echoes the essentialist notions tied up with ‘participatory,’ ‘local-led,’ or ‘bottom-up’ development by inferring that there is a particularly Malian way of governing Malians.

More importantly, this assumption of difference – that Malians engage with industrial work in a particularly Malian way (thus necessitating Malian bosses) – is used to justify very real material inequalities: non-expatriate Africans who work in Mali’s industrial mines receive salaries vastly inferior to those of their expatriate counterparts, and do not enjoy the benefits provided for expatriate staff. Those benefits are dramatically displayed in the physical layout of mining concessions. Within the mine’s perimeter are gated
expatriate communities replete with electricity, potable, running water, Internet connectivity, and a private airstrip to fly expatriate workers and gold ingots directly to other countries; in the town outside the gates there is no Internet, no or very little electricity, insufficient potable water, and a dearth of all-season roads. In the 1930s and 40s, strike waves of African laborers demanding ‘equal pay for equal work’ underlined the contradictions of segregated colonial societies and shook the foundations of British and French empires. Imperial administrations responded with the first official utterances of development – the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and the French Investment Fund for Social and Economic Development (FIDES) of 1946 – in an effort to channel those demands into a logic of state-led change (Cooper, 1996 and 2002). Development, then, was meant to maintain empire, to renew its legitimacy and the legitimacy of exclusion. Today, development discourse still serves the interests of difference, justifying the conceptual and real separation of a world of mobility (freedom of movement in search of prosperity) from a world of immobility, both outward (geographic) and upward (social). Still, discourse does not translate perfectly into reality. As shown above, the history of development discourse is also one of resistance to it.

**Political Mobility**

Kayes has a history of dynamic connections to other parts of the world. Indeed, historians have shown that it is Kayes’s connections that have sustained populations there for centuries, a strategy of ‘local’ survival that depends on survival elsewhere. Gold produced in the Bambuhu region (in French, Bambouk, where today’s industrial mines and orpailleure sites are concentrated), bounded by the Falémé river to the West and the Bafing River to the East, attracted Europeans since the late 15th century – and the Arab world for a millennium before that – because it was connected to patterns of regional, and especially Senegambian, trade. Precolonal, artisanal gold production long depended on the work of slaves and periodic migrant laborers who mined gold during the dry season when cultivation was impossible (for the lack of flood plains) and the water table low enough for digging (Curtin 1973, 629). Gold was exchanged across the Sahara for salt, animals, wheat, dates, and fabric, and as far as the coasts of Ghana and Ivory Coast for rubber, cola nuts, ivory, millet, and slaves, in a network that thrived between the 8th and 15th centuries (Mbodj 2009, 4). Soninké traders from Northern Kayes and Senegal played a large role in sustaining Bambuhu, bringing animals, salt, and more slaves “that the region did not seem able to feed” (Manchuelle 2004, 68-69).

But itinerant trading by neighboring populations does not indicate that gold-producers of Southern Kayes were immobile. On the contrary, in his seminal work on Soninké migrations in northern Kayes and northeastern Senegal, Manchuelle points out that migratory processes spill outside of their original geographic and social boundaries, that “the ethnic frontiers of this migration were and remain fluid” (2004, 323-324). Further, southern Kayes, like the North, lacked a strong centralized power where “there is little if no restriction of movement” (64). The geological nature of gold in Kayes also
ensures that its producers are mobile. It is scattered across hundreds of miles, not concentrated – a factor that resisted intensive (and promoted extensive) production for centuries (Curtin 1973, 628). Nwanunobi also alludes to the off-season labor migration of orpailleurs and suggests that the Malinké “developed a culture of migration” dating back to trading colonies of the Mali Empire that stretched as far as Hausa territory, situating the Malinké in Senegal and Gambia over 600 years ago (1996, 17).

Southern Kayes has long been an area where people reside but depend upon connections to distant places and the ability to move between them. How it came to be imagined as isolated, cut-off, and underdeveloped has much to do with the development discourse, but there are historical changes to take into account. Colonial borders, the abolition of slavery, tax policies, forced labor, desertification, fluctuations in gold prices, post-colonial restrictions on land-use and orpailleurs, the colonial and post-colonial concentration of economic activity in capitals and on coasts, etc. – all had debilitating effects on the human ecology that sustained the gold-producing region of southern and central Kayes. At the same time, salaried work elsewhere, and the diversified range of potential migratory destinations, have made it possible for much of Kayes to remain oriented towards the ‘exterior.’ Indeed, many decisions that affect the governing of villages and collectivities within the region are today made elsewhere. Not only the mining companies and projects of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but migrants from all over Kayes residing in other cities and countries participate in a complex system of transnational governance in Kayes that coexists with the Malian state, even with its recently decentralized form, the ‘commune.’

Today, the continued mobility of orpailleurs and migrants poses a threat to the Malian government’s profitable control of natural resources and to its conceptual authority as legitimate developer of a ‘backwards’ and static population. Orpailleurs extract gold in an illegal industry that the Malian government cannot regulate, and – in competitions with industrial mines over land claims – throw into question the legitimacy of industrial mining operations entirely. Migrants from southern Kayes organized in France have also successfully protested the concentration of power over gold extraction in the government’s hands. In doing so they have challenged its existential purpose as regulator, developer, benefactor and protector of ‘local’ populations – as well as its revenues. In all of this, populations in and from southern Kayes have become something that development presupposes them not to be: mobile and connected to a world that promises the dream of material welfare and political significance.

Orpailleurs resisted attempts at ‘localization’ by the first independent government of Mali, refusing to participate in its agricultural development agenda that demanded they be sedentary (see above). Today, orpailleurs are part of a vast, illegal economy with sophisticated networks and connections to multiple countries that are unmediated by the Malian state. They create wealth that the state has not been able collect revenue from nor regulate. Over 100,000 orpailleurs were recently estimated to be operating in Kenièba (of a population of 200,000), though movement into Senegal and Guinea, and from there into Kenièba, is nearly unfettered. A large network of gold buyers from Bamako circulate between these three countries, smuggle gold into Mali, and resell gold back in Bamako at international market prices updated to the minute. Even those who have ‘formalized’ their business by selling through licensed exporters are overpowered by the sheer size of the illegal industry, which brings down prices by evading taxes.
The displacement of orpailleage sites by industrial mines is often the scene of immense tension between the informal gold economy and the formal, industrial one authorized by the Malian state, especially since orpailleurs have taken advantage of associational freedoms to organize. The first association of orpailleurs was established in the commune of Sitakily in the late 1980s. Its function was primarily financial, and it made enough profit to hire geologists and technicians from Canada and the United States to help manage its rural ‘factory.’ Disbanded before the advent of heavy industrial mining, it nevertheless engendered associations that are active today. Both in Kayes and in other mineral-rich regions, orpailleurs have repurposed associations to respond to the vicissitudes of industrial mine operations (themselves the function of volatile, multinational capital). One of these is in Sikasso, the southernmost region of Mali, where orpailleurs recently arrived at agreements with the Wassoulou gold mine to continue orpailleage within the mine’s perimeter. Here, not only is an illegal industry claiming a degree of legitimacy, but it has taken control of the official discourse on the ‘local:’ whereas the government has traditionally posed orpailleurs as ‘locals’ to justify repressive agricultural development interventions, now orpailleurs use the ‘local’ identification to make a claim on the gold resources in ‘local’ land against foreign capital interests.

This example illustrates the ambiguity of the ‘local’ claim: it may justify a highly undemocratic government intervention and deplorable conditions of resource extraction; or it may challenge government and corporate authority as external and alien. Like orpailleurs in Sikasso, residents of Djidjan turned this ambiguity to their advantage. Protesters there challenged a ‘local’ identity (agricultural, uneducated) by claiming the right to work at the industrial mine that displaced their homes and livelihoods, and to negotiate directly with foreign mine owners (a position normally reserved for something less ‘local,’ the Malian state). But they later invoked this same ‘localness’ to justify their priority in the mine’s hiring processes. Indeed, they went as far as to claim the ‘foreignness’ of workers who came from other mines in Mali to work at the Loulo gold mine, arguing that ‘local’ youth had priority for unskilled labor positions. What emerged in Djidjan was a complex battle for the meaning of ‘local,’ where the desire for a global entity to regulate mining activities was also articulated. The rejection of a Malian authority (Malianization) as mediator, and the claim to negotiate on the same plane as multinational corporations, makes this conception of the ‘local’ one that includes connection to the ‘outside’ world at large. It is a transnational concept, a melding of the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ that challenges the state’s “claims of superior spatial reach” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 995).

The articulation of an identity that is both tied to the land of southern Kayes, and at the same time geographically, socially mobile, is perhaps best expressed in the political activism of migrants from southern Kayes living in France. They have been integral to disturbing the development discourse of geographic immobility and social stasis that is hoisted on the region and its people. Not only have these migrants physically transgressed the development space, they have also accessed a spectacularly different material world. Many form linkages from friends and family living in Kayes to the material ‘first world,’ through remittances and projects like building schools, medical clinics, and water pumps. But their material access is also intimately tied up with political empowerment. With the resources that they obtain – especially the financial stability to hire international lawyers and the communications technology to command the attention of media, activists, and
government institutions in multiple countries – they become a formidable rival to the other transnational influences in the zone, industrial gold mines.

For several years after industrial extraction of gold began in Sadiola, residents complained about deplorable living conditions and environmental degradation. Though more than once, women and youth marched on the mine to protest insufficient and poisoned water sources, the mining company and the Malian state neglected to conduct water analyses or investigations of health concerns. But in 2002-2003, migrants organized in the Association of Citizens of the Sadiola Commune in France (ARCSF) solicited the help of an international NGO – Friends of the Earth – to conduct a health and environmental inspection of Sadiola. The latter published a report citing health problems among workers and in the community, as well as the degradation of land and wildlife. Sadiola’s migrants also made contact with a documentary filmmaker involved with a French NGO, Survie, who made a film about the popular movement in Sadiola. Eventually, under international pressure, the mining company decided to hold regular public consultations with members of the Sadiola community to explain mining developments and respond to questions; its health and environmental inspections are also more frequent and extensive.

Some migrants also mobilized to take over official government institutions in Sadiola. The migrant mainly behind the creation of ARCSF used the association as a platform to drive out and replace former Sadiola mayor B. Cissoko, a member of the national government’s ruling party who was viewed as corrupt, ineffective, and complicit with the mining company in silencing popular discontent. The migrant’s potential run for mayor caused divisions within ARCSF, and he eventually formed a new association, Paridiola (a combination of “Paris” and “Sadiola”). This second association, however, was excluded from the “twin-city” agreement that was in the midst of being finalized between Nord-Pas de Calais in France and Sadiola in Mali, and mediated by an international NGO, the Research and Project Group for Rural Development (GRDR).

Still, a representative from Sadiola, sent to France to sign an agreement with Nord-Pas de Calais, would eventually become the current mayor with the support of ARCSF. Himself a former migrant to Congo-Brazzaville, he returned to Sadiola when mining activities began, working there for several years and participating in the labor union. In a July 2009 protest organized by youth in Sadiola, police investigators (the protest turned violent after government security forces attacked peaceful demonstrators) suspected the new mayor of involvement in organizing the strike, though he was never charged. Migrants of ARCSF – also thought to be in support of protesters – helped to publicize the events in national and foreign media.

Transnational organizing in Sadiola represents a subversion to Malian state authority not only because it was mobilized against state property (the government owns a 20% stake in the mine), and not only because a ‘local’ institution of government authority, the mayor’s office, was effectively taken over. More importantly, regulation of the environmental consequences of gold mining – ostensibly a government responsibility – was sought outside of Mali. The government’s position as sovereign protector of its territory was conceptually undermined because migrants from Sadiola in France have successfully positioned themselves alongside it as legitimate representatives of the ‘local’ Sadiola commune abroad and of the cosmopolitan world in Sadiola. The above examples reveal the ambiguous significance of the migrant/local dichotomy, as well as the complex power relations behind it. As Malkki (1992) has shown, the ‘local’ identity – like the
migrant identity – can be either “‘incarcerating’” or empowering (29). Whereas the Malian government formerly delineated the ‘local’ identity in southern Kayes as sedentary and agrcultural, today’s orpailleurs and migrants have successfully recycled it, such that mobility is a basic component of ‘local’ political legitimacy.

The Depoliticization of Mobility

Kayes and Kayes's migrants in France have become something of a pet case for studies of African migration to Europe, perhaps due to intense public debate about African migration to France, and the fact that Kayes is “the main source of Sub-Saharan Africans” who migrate there (Azam and Gubert, 2005). The French government has a special interest in Kayes, too. In a move more proactive than its generally austere measures against illegal immigration, it has turned to its national aid agency since 1997 for projects designed to encourage “stay-at-home” development in the places from which migrants issue – Kayes being one of the main targets – and tries to enlist migrants’ help in implementation. Titled “co-development,” the scheme tackles problems perceived to encourage potential migrants, and is coupled with offers of stipends to illegal immigrants to pay for their return ‘home’ (1334).33

Studies of Kayes’s migrants in France – perhaps in reaction to the obviously problematic aims of the French immigration apparatus – highlight the political agency of migrants who mobilize against discriminatory housing, employment, and immigration policies, and who strive to end popular stigmatization against them.34 On the other hand, when it comes to the activities of migrants ‘at home,’ the discussion is emptied of political significance. Migrants’ engagements with Kayes are discussed in these studies in uniquely developmentalist terms: money transferred, school books paid for, clinics built. Activities ‘back home’ are entirely depoliticized, and those who reside in Kayes become passive, apolitical recipients of projects that appear to happen in a vacuum. A crude form of modernization theory, which views populations in Kayes as inert and ‘underdeveloped,’ erases their political experience and implies that the bare facts of migration and ‘integration’ now authorize migrants to act – like others, in the interests of development – on those who were left behind.

Contemporary studies of migration between Kayes and France participate in the conceptual construction of Kayes as a ‘development space,’ an ongoing and variable construction that, as shown previously, has affected the lives of Kayesians for decades. These studies persistently identify migrants from Kayes in relation to development ‘back home.’ Not only do they infer the expectation that development should be a natural preoccupation for (or responsibility of) migrants, but migrants, whether good for development or bad, become inexorably linked to the development problematic. At the same time that development discourse ‘incarcerates the native’ in Mali, so does it ‘incarcerate’ Malian migrants abroad.

More alarmingly, these studies also positively link the development work of migrants and migrants’ associations to their social ‘integration’ in France.35 This tendency
conceptually separates the two spaces (development happens ‘over there,’ integration happens ‘in here’) and maps across them a long discredited logic of ‘modernization’ that goes well beyond access to material goods and markets. Indeed, for these studies, the question of change between resident of a developing place, and migrant from a developing place, is profoundly cultural.

In a framework where development in a poor country is opposed to integration in a rich one, ‘those who were left behind’ are painted as archaic, backwards, or ‘premodern.’ In much of the literature on remittances to Kayes, for example, commentators pose the question whether remittances encourage or discourage ‘modern’ agricultural techniques (Azam and Gubert 2005, 1347). This problematic assumes that agricultural techniques in use in Kayes are somehow not ‘modern,’ and that there are ‘modern’ techniques elsewhere that can improve production – an assumption that inspired rural development interventions aimed at increasing agricultural output in British and French African colonies since the early 20th century.36 Similarly, others qualify the outcome of migrants’ development work ‘at home’ in terms of “change in comportment and manners,” the “transmission of ideas and values” (Charef and Gonin 2005, 17-18), “social change” (Daum 2005, 374) or “social remittances” (Kastoryano 2000, 309) – all of which suggest that the migrant, having integrated into a modern setting, now has the ability to foster cultural change in the developing areas from which he or she came. In other commentary on migrant development work in Kayes, practitioners recommend that village associations ‘back home’ need to “assume a modern status and procedure” and replace “the order of traditional lineage” so as to become more suitable collaborators in the work of migrant associations abroad (Gauvrit and Le Balers 2004, 22). Here, the migrant, having left ‘traditional lineage’ behind for a ‘modern status,’ becomes a harbinger of change. Inferred is a social evolution from non-migrant (still in the development space) to migrant in France (now qualified to control the terms of that development).

Though Kayes’s migrants in France are no longer in the developing space, they do not entirely transcend a logic that, before their border crossing, held them as objects of development. In the migration-development literature on Kayes, there is a widespread view of migrant development work as not quite ‘modern’ enough. The familiar debate over the positive and negative impacts of financial transfers or remittances on development in ‘sending’ areas shows that, in some ways, migrants are still ‘modernizing.’37 At worst, development specialists see remittances as bad for development in ‘sending’ areas and an impediment to the migrant’s integration in another country.38 At their best, remittances are helpful to the ‘sending’ area in hard times, but still too individualistic to have lasting, widespread impact. Though there are development practitioners who indeed recommend individual cash transfers to families in a given geographical space,39 when it comes to migrants, “the question is certainly one of profound social transformation... looking for a cumulative effect between individual initiatives and larger, more collective tendencies” (Daum 2002, 44). Migrants’ style of development is held as ‘informal’ and inferior to the official, bureaucratic, and thoroughly ‘modern’ world of development expertise.

Hometown associations thus enjoy more esteem in the migration-development literature, because they find this ‘cumulative effect’ by organizing money, collaborating with professional NGOs, and operating through official government channels. In official discourses, the development efforts of migrants’ hometown associations are nearly universally lauded, following the pattern of what Bakewell (2008, 1349) has described as
the quest for the “virtuous circle”: the “win-win-win” endgame where migrant development work is good for the ‘sending’ country (promoting development ‘over there’), the migrant (promoting integration ‘in here’), and the receiving country (managing south-to-north migration). It is in this vein that French state institutions and scholars have promoted “development as the source of integration” (Lacroix 2006).

Still, hometown associations do not receive the same treatment as other development organizations. They are “labeled as foreign,” with the effect that “the ministries are not disposed to finance associations of foreign migrants residing in France.” Most hometown associations are thus required to pass through “the intermediary (and the tutelage) of national NGOs” and very few (less than 20%) receive public funding (Lacroix 2006). While migration-development specialists decry this prejudice by French state institutions, they ironically give scientific legitimacy to the same logic that excludes migrant associations from public benefits. Indeed, the tutelage of official NGOs is justified by what these same analysts represent as informal, archaic, and inefficient development work performed by migrants. Assuming the existence of a more desirable and professional development worker, they pose migrant development work as, itself, ‘undeveloped.’ Migrant associations, though better than migrant remittances, work inefficiently and with “a weak knowledge of bureaucratic vocabulary” (Lacroix 2006). Not quite a ‘developee,’ not quite a ‘developer,’

“the question of identity of this new style of partner rests in suspense. The project bearers are migrants before they are developers. Their ‘culture’ of development, their methodology, and their path differs from those of coordinators of NGOs” (Lacroix 2006).

As with those targeted for development in Kayes, the shortcomings of migrant development work is situated within the migrant – and the solution, without:

“the inscription of Osim [Organizations of International Migrant Solidarity] in official channels of international cooperation profoundly modified their functioning... a better formalization of their activities and a professionalization of personnel... a merging of concepts and of methods. This process is underway, but it will not be achieved until it translates into a real collaboration around joint projects” (Lacroix 2006).

Development practitioners, too, prefer migrant development work to be brought under their aegis. Gauvrit and Le Balers (2004) assert that when professional NGOs intervene in migrant associations’ work, they “inspire associations to modify their modus operandi” by encouraging “feasibility studies, a more systematic implication of beneficiaries in the elaboration of projects, the provision of managing techniques” and other amendments that will guarantee more responsibility and durability. In the end, NGOs will help migrants “inscribe their actions in a durable and balanced development perspective” (Charef and Gonin 2005, 17).

These analyses take for granted the authority of a credentialed, bureaucratic development industry – and the subordination of migrant development work to it – without asking what development expertise actually means. For more than a decade, scholars have shown in great detail that, well before development became an official project of British and French empires, different academic disciplines offered competing
claims to the knowledge of social engineering sought first by colonial administrations and later by independent African governments. The development expert has always been a contingent product of complex power relations. In different historical contexts, institutions responsible for development sought different solutions from academics. But behind the ideational changes remains the persistent search for scientific solutions to questions that are, at base, political. Technical problems like agricultural output, health services, and education obscure claims to political democracy, mobility, and access to consumer markets and public goods. If a development NGO warrants more authority in Kayes’s development than migrants, it is not because of some natural ability, but because of the unequal political clout of people who are still seen, in some ways, as ‘developing.’

Besides losing sight of the political terrain that links migrants, development experts and NGOs, and the places and people targeted for development, this apolitical and modernist picture of migrant-run development has tangible effects. As mentioned above, migrant associations do not receive the same monetary assistance as expert-led development work. Because they have not attained the bureaucratic heights of ‘modern’ development, migrants are instead subordinate to government-sanctioned aid channels and official NGOs that often have opposing political interests. Furthermore, the objectification of ‘target populations’ authorizes any number of actions by those outside of the development space. The modernist discourse that disenfranchises migrant associations from public funding also allows mining companies to exclude ‘locals’ from industrial work in Djidjian, and NGOs to promote (or sometimes impose) a sedentary lifestyle in Kenieba.

In Kayes, the privileged authority of mining companies and development NGOs – premised on their modernity, mobility, and development know-how – is evident. But migrants, as ‘informal’ developers, also enjoy benefits of their increasingly (as they ‘integrate’) ‘modern’ status. In Sadiola, where migrant-supported protests led to an undermining of state authority, migrants have set up a powerful political machine, well connected outside of Mali, with little in the way of opposition in Sadiola. And their style of politics – where legitimacy infers both a claim to represent the ‘locale’ as well as access to the material wealth and political power associated with the global ‘first world’ – excludes another category of migrant and ‘local.’ Those from elsewhere in Mali and neighboring countries who have come to work at the Sadiola mine appear unrepresented, and are perceived as ‘foreigners’ by notables in Sadiola and abroad. They in turn perceive migrants from Sadiola, who live in France and dominate commune politics, as paternalistic foreigners who “think that, with the few things they learned in France, they can come back and change people’s ways here.”

Elsewhere in Mali, studies of decentralization have shown that the creation of ‘local’ governing institutions has opened up a possibility for organized migrants to influence politics ‘at home’: the opening of a mayoral office spawned a “twin-city” agreement between Niafunké and Allier (France), which was used by ambitious residents “to impose themselves politically in Niafunké and gain seats for their political parties at the national level” (Lafay 2005, 311, n. 40). Not far from Sadiola, in Dindinaye, villagers wanted to build an Islamic school; migrants from Dindinaye residing in France, however, preferred a secular school, taught in French, with emphasis on girl’s education. In the end, after a long campaign by migrants, the secular school was built (Gauvrit and Le Balers 2004, 64). Here, the developer/developee and migrant/local distinction is salient, as is the power dynamic between them, so much so that the authors suggest that “the formulation of projects is
much more often the work of migrants’ associations who propose, or even impose, projects on the Malian community” (69).

What disappears from the picture painted by migration specialists are the messy political realities of the unified space that includes Paris and Sadiola, which help us to see how the exclusion of migrants from political and economic rights in France is intimately bound to similar exclusions in the gold-rich region of southern Kayes. Many authors have already described how Malian migrants put pressure on French institutions and fight policies that exclude them from housing, work, and other rights. But their political activity at home is less studied. Certain commentators seem to want to demonstrate the integrity of Malian migrants in France by valorizing their contributions in France and in Mali. This is not in itself a bad thing – many migrants defy amazing restraints to improve their own lives and the lives of others, and their resistance to discriminatory institutions is important to learn from. But it should not be done at the expense of their political experience (and that of the ‘developees’ back ‘home’), which gets lost in a heroizing picture. More productive would be to ask how Africans navigate institutions (both physical and discursive) to migrate, rather than why they migrate, or how they change when they migrate, or how they change the places from which they come – all of which, for African migrants in particular, presuppose the ambiguous development venture.

Migrants have political agency not only in the places they migrated from, not only in the places they migrated to, but in a single, unified space. Malian migrants in France are not ‘of two worlds;’ they are of one world, but with dramatically unequal parts. If they are involved in the social, political or economic vitality of where they came from, it is not as part of the happy picture of an international development world looking after the poor and downtrodden, but as part of the transnational governing complex that is specific to the world described as ‘developing,’ which happens to be largely situated on the African continent. If there is to be a migration theory specific to Africa, perhaps the interweaving of migration within this complex would be a productive point of departure.
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**Archival Materials**

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**Interviews**

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Soulemanye Berthé, General Secretary of the Confederation of Malian Workers (CSTM) union at the Loulo underground mine, interview in Djidjan, Mali, February 22nd, 2010.

Hawa Cissoko, former President of the first orpailleurs’ association in Mali. Interview in Tabakoto, Mali, April 3rd, 2010.

Fatoumata Dabo, President of a gold buyer’s association, Accor, interview in Fourou, Mali, May 17th, 2010.

Mamadou Dabo, General Secretary of the Confederation of Malian Workers (CSTM) union at the Sadiola mine, interview in Sadiola, Mali, February 4th, 2010.

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Le Vieux Kanté, resident of Sadiola and former miner, interview in Djidjan, April 6th, 2010.

Ibrahim N’Diaye, former Sadiola field-officer of the Groupe de recherche et de réalisations pour le développement rural (GRDR), interview in Kayes, Mali, September 5th, 2010.

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1 This anecdote is based on field research in Djidjan, Mali, in the fall of 2009, made possible by the Fulbright Grant for Study/Research. In Bambara, “toubab” or “tubab” is an ambiguous term meaning “white,” “European,” or sometimes, “French.” See Bailleul (1996). More importantly, here, the term also has a deep-seeded socioeconomic connotation. Nonwhites from ‘the West’ are often referred to as “toubabs” because of the assumed economic significance of their nationality or residency. Curry (2007) includes, among other definitions of “toubab,” “the reflection of the way people from Senegal tend to perceive black Africans acting ‘white’ in an African setting,” and the “[loss of] identity and [conversion] to western values” (1).

2 See, for example, Fanon (1965, 1967).

3 See Dubner and Levitt (2009), and Easterly (2009).


5 Gold has become over the 2000s the leading source of revenue from exports in Mali. See Parker and Wood (2006, 4).

6 L’Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (the Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally).

7 “Orpaillage” is the French word for artisanal gold mining. An “orpailleur” is one who mines in this way.

8 Interview with A. Dembele, May 13th, 2010.

9 Interview with A. Bâ, February 8th, 2010.

10 Also absent from the USAID report was the fact that much land previously used for farming, grazing and orpaillage had been taken over or ruined by industrial mining activities. For a detailed understanding of the relationship between agricultural work and industrial mines in Mali, Senegal, and Guinea, see Mbodj (2009).

11 For Sadiola and Yatela, see Sissoko (2010); for Tabakoto and Loulo, see Orez (2009).

12 Interview with Le Vieux Kanté, April 6th, 2010: “President Alpha told us to not abandon the agriculture that is our travail since the beginning: that otherwise, when the mining project ends, it will be difficult for us.”

13 ‘Notables’ is the French word for autochthones of an area, though the category is fluid: in villages in western Mali, someone whose origins are elsewhere can become a notable of a given village through social connections, political influence, or simply duration.

14 Interview with Soulemanye Berthé, February 22nd, 2010.
See Fay (2005) for the role of essentialized ethnic categories in – and the colonial roots of – ‘participatory’
development in Mali.

According to Jul-Larsen et al (2006), most people living near gold mines were skeptical of ‘Malianization’: “[Villagers] also argued that the reason why many Malians were employed was not primarily Semos’s preoccupation with capacity-building or development – rather, the policy of ‘Malianisation’ was in their view
driven mainly by economic concerns: “Malianisation is very advantageous for the company. If an expatriate
who is paid four million CFAF is replaced by a Malian the enterprise gains enormously... because the Malian
managers get much less. That’s good business for Semos” (24).

For historical perceptions of Bambouk by outsiders, see Curtin (1973).

See CSA (2006), Magrin (2009) and Mboj (2009) for descriptions of southern Kayes as isolated. See Daum
(2002) for a similar illustration of northern Kayes.

Leclerc-Olive (2005), Lafay (2005), and Gauvrit and Le Balers (2004) discuss the competition among
decentralized authorities, NGOs and migrants in Mali.

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See Bermúdez-Lugo (2009, 28.2).

Interview with Fatoumata Dabo, May 17th, 2010.

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Interview with Ibrahim N'Diaye, September 5th, 2010.

See SISSOKO (2010)
See also Daum (2002).

See, for example, Daum and Le Guay (1995), Le Guay (2002), and Trauner (2004).

For the link between migrant development work and integration in France, see Trauner (2004), Gauvrit
Duffield (2006, 72) for the British case; De Haas shows that the Netherlandish government reversed this
meaning, and saw economic connection to originating countries as working against integration of the migrant
– but the author then counters and argues that integration and development work are positively correlated
(2005, 1276); see Charef and Gonin (2005) for the development-integration relationship in general.

See Hodge (2007) for the influence of modernization theory on British attempts at modernizing colonial
agriculture. See van Beusekom (2002) for a similar narrative in French colonies.

See Azam and Gubert (2005) for a short review of the debate on remittances.

See De Haas (2005). The most rigorous economic research on remittances to Kayes supports the
“conventional wisdom” that “farmers left behind in the village indulge in some ‘shirking’ when they are
insured by one or several migrants from their family” (Azam and Gubert 2005, 1334).

See Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme (2010).

The first official declarations of development came in 1940 for Great Britain (The Colonial Development
and Welfare Act) and 1946 for France (the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development, or FIDES).

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