Country Paper:
The Democratic Republic of Congo

Report prepared for the
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**Foreword**

This profile, initiated in the context of the MacArthur Programme: African Perspectives on Human Mobility stems from the bibliographical research undertaken in the libraries of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The facts presented in this profile do not originate from carrying empirical research on migrations in the DRC; on the contrary, we intend to discuss migrations through the words analysed by others. We did not study the object, but indeed the representations of the object such as they can be apprehended from documentation. To that end, three towns with University traditions were selected as the sites for documentary research. These towns are: Kinshasa in the west, the capital of the country: it is home to several universities and to higher education institutions. The second town is Lubumbashi in the south: a mining town with a University; while the third town is Bukavu, located in the east, in the main area of crisis and violence. The focus was concentrated on widely broadcast documentary works and also on probing works that constitute the ‘grey documentation’ such as Doctorate theses, Higher Education memos (DES = Diplôme d’Etudes Supérieures) and graduate work.

During a visit to Burundi, the offer was made to work in the central library of the national University of Burundi in Bujumbura, for a brief but most instructive stay in many respects within the context of this research.

**The aims of the profile**

The intention is to:

1. Take stock of the documentary materials (listing) on the issues of migrations from and inside the Democratic Republic of Congo.
2. Extract the migration dynamics as they are reflected in the documentation listed and consulted.
3. Establish the level of debate and theories that have been raised in the Democratic republic of Congo by the questions on migrations.
4. Create a database on which the implementation of a coherent research project relating to the Programme will rest.

The elaboration of this profile is the result of several people’s efforts in several cities of the DRC. It is appropriate to thank them here for their availability. Without their participation, this work would not be complete, or would have only been completed with
countless difficulties. In the east of the country, our assistants in the Official University of Bukavu have agreed to collate the bibliographical data. They are M. Kadanga Mulume Oderwha Philippe and Kamwanga Dominique – Clerks of Works – and Munenge Florent, assistant. In Kinshasa, M. Charles Nkunda, assistant at the National Museum, M. Vincent Ejiba, researcher, and M. Lokolila Mwana Bata, researcher, have travelled great distances to comb through the various libraries in the capital. In Lubumbashi, the team comprised of Kakez Kayeb, assistant, from the ‘Département des Relations Internationales de l’Université de Lubumbashi’, Ngoy Muteba, Assistant, from the Open University in Lubumbashi, Ntambwa Kayembe and Kabika Etobo, assistants from the Official University of Mbuji Mayi. The last words of thanks go to Rachel Mbeya who undertook the management and logistical tasks of the project.
Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo covers an area of 2 345 000 km². According to some documents available in 2008, it has a population of 66 514 506. The population density is 25 persons per km². The growth rate of the population in the country is 2.8% (2005), while it was 3.0% in 1975, 2.9% in 1985 and 3.5% in 1995 (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs/Population Division, 2006:185). Officially, it has to be admitted that an official census has not been carried out in long time. According to Léon de Saint Moulin, the colonial
period provides archives from which annual population statistics were extracted. After the independence, scientific census took place in 1970 and in 1984 (De Saint Moulin, 1987:3-31). Thereafter, several attempts at administrative census have taken place, but were unsuccessful because they met with opposition from the population in some provincial cities: indications allowing the identification of ethnic origins created frustrations and the fear of a pogrom. In other words, population counts are approximate.

Socio-demographic details show that the under-15 account for 47.1% of the population; while the over-64 account for 2.5%. The urban population accounts for 32.1% and the percentage of under-nourished people amounts to 74%\(^1\). The growth of GDP is estimated at 6.2% and the rate of inflation is 9% for 2008. With the mining sector dominating the economy, copper, cobalt, diamonds and other minerals such as Germanium, Coltan, etc. figure prominently. The strongly ‘rentier’ (Omeje, 2007:1-25) economy is not really performing: it is essentially importing a large range of basic necessity products, in the industrial and food sectors. The activities of the informal sector are predominant.

Prior to its accession to independence on June 30, 1960, the Democratic Republic of Congo went through four phases: the first phase stretches from time immemorial to 1885 and is of no interest to us. The second phase begins in that year when the Independent State of Congo is created, a judicial fictitious entity which is in fact the characterization of this land as the private property of Leopold II, King of the Belgians. This short phase extends from 1885 to 1908 because at that time, Belgium inherits the land and makes it a colony. The colonial period \textit{per se} runs from 1908 to 1960 when the country gains its independence.

The DRC is a sovereign country in which political crises occurring against a background of violence are a characteristic feature. Civil wars are recurrent. After independence, the first five years and the first Republic (1960-1965) were dominated by instability: two provinces attempted to secede – the Province of Katanga and the Province of South Kasaï – while rebel movements were proliferating in many places, leading to the instauration of a people’s government that occupied the Eastern Province of the country. In that context, population movements took place internally. These people were the first batches of internally displaced persons and refugees of the post-colonial period.

\(^1\) See \url{www.statistiques-mondiales.com/congo-Kinshasa.html}
When the First Republic was overthrown by a military coup that empowered a new régime in 1965, the political situation calmed down after some predictable unrest that was particularly felt in the Eastern part of the country. Mercenaries attempted to invade the town of Bukavu. The military operation undertaken by governmental troops stopped the advance of the rebels while masses of population fled from their villages, heading for the interior of the country, or for bordering countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania or Zambia. As peace was re-established in most of the country, internal population movements were recorded in the context of the rural exodus or of urban-rural migration. However, rural exodus is more predominant than urban-rural migration because at the time of the Second Republic (1965-1997), only the State could exploit the abundant mineral resources of the territory, following the liberalization of natural resources in 1983 (Ngoie & Omeje, 2007: 137).

While the strength of the régime of the Second Republic was based on an “obscurantist dictatorship”, according to the poignant phrase of “obscurantist despotism” coined by Edem Kodjo (1985: 153), the régime began to encounter difficulties stemming from discontent linked to poor economic performance. The endless economic crisis is settling in this country, however well endowed by nature: growing into an ever larger ordeal for its populations. During the 80s, it was only by submitting itself to the strict demands of international financial institutions that the Democratic Republic of Congo (known as Zaire at that time) could find salvation. These institutions subjected the country to structural adjustment programmes. The salaries of State employees were squeezed – a sector that only provides 4.1% of national employment for the active population, incidentally; study bursaries were cancelled, public hospitals no longer received State subsidies. The political propaganda in full flow will even find a leitmotiv that will be repeated across the screen of the contemporary official television broadcasts announcing “the demise of the Providential State”. The demise of the Providential State did effectively occur: the Congolese population found itself abandoned to its own devices. While the governing classes were helping themselves generously under some ‘inheritance rationale’, the populations were witnessing a daily deterioration of their living conditions. The economic crisis became a structural one. All economic aggregates were showing red warning lights. In the 90, the poor management of the demands from the population that the régime should be liberalized made the plunge of the country into crisis more complex still.
Currently, and since that time, economic performance does not presage an honorable past, or a good future. In serene fashion, Ngub’Usil Mpay-Nka uses a climatic metaphor to describe the crisis in the country:” In its recent past, The DRC has been through “rain and sunshine”. Rain, deluge even, was the period of nearly 8 years characterized by armed conflicts and their consequences that our country has endured from 1996 to 2003. All these sociopolitical events, added to other previous economic factors, have led to negative economic indicators and human development indices. The rate of unemployment has increased and remains at worrying levels, with 4 to 6% of jobs for the active population in the formal sector and nearly 89% disguised unemployment. At that time, the average Congolese had an income of less than 1USD per day…A slow but progressive recovery of is taking place: the GDP becoming positive at 3.5% in 2002, while it was 3.2% negative on average between 1995 and 2000, with a record low of -11% in 2000.” (2008: 343).

Meanwhile, internal population movements are taking place from rural settings towards urban centres. Kinshasa is the reception centre for most of the Congolese population in a rural exodus. Urban centres do not have adequate infrastructures to be of help to these people. Towns are thus shanty-towns in this country. In such a context, migratory movements of Congolese populations are accelerating towards African bordering countries, Western Europe and the United States of America. International migration is highly valued and it creates varied and subtle ‘modus operandi’. [The valorization of migration is part of the imaginary society of the inhabitants in urban and rural settings alike as they negotiate the modernity occurring in a context of crisis. Such imaginary society grants migration a prime role as a kind of portfolio diversification in a country where reassurance is not provided by a more than evanescent State (De Boeck et al., 2005; Sumata et al., 2004: 135-154).]

In 1996, war broke out again, leading to the end of the Mobutu reign, in a State with no infrastructures and a battered country where the quality of life for the population was not the main priority of the government. In fact, the latter took the Congolese state hostage by imposing on it a rationale of accumulation disconnected from the promotion of the general interest. Today, even, ‘neo-patrimonialist’ political practices in exercising power are not entirely eradicated from the field of public affairs management. Martin Ekwa bis Isal expresses this quite well in his writing: “Despite its exceptional duration, undoubtedly necessary, the transition did not totally rid the (Congolese) government and governed people of burdens and reflexes inherited from colonization and mostly from the Second Republic. It
may even have added others. The hypertrophy of the political class and the plethora of candidates to electoral mandates indicate that politics are still experienced and understood as the place for rapid agrandisement and wealth accumulation, without effort” (2008:134).

In this respect, the report of the Dutch Institute for Southern Africa (NiZA) has coined an evocative name for the nature of the State in this country when it mentions “the State against the people”, and it states: “A large part of the failure of the transition can be attributed to bad governance and to the corruption of the current political class in the DRC. Historically, the DRC is collapsing under the burden of some form of ‘governmentality’ which represents the main obstacle to the reconstruction of the country and to the adequate management of the humanitarian crisis confronting it. At all levels of the State apparatus, public function is regarded as a means to acquire personal wealth and privileges.” (Niza, 2006: 9).

The régime of the Second Republic came to an end in 1997. President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who vanquished M. Mobutu, assumes power. The new régime changes the official name of the country that reverts to DRC; the Zaïre name is banished as it represents the dark period of the reign of President Mobutu. A year after his coming into power, the new régime comes under attack and war breaks out, internally and internationally. In view of the number of States implicated in that conflict, either in support of the Kinshasa régime, or with the intention of weakening it by siding with rebel movements, this war was regarded as the “first African war”. This war will last five years. In order to resolve the conflict, several diplomatic meetings were organized between African States and the DRC, as well as between the political forces in the country. At the end of the negotiation process, the spirit of the Lusaka agreement (1999) will give rise to the need to install a new internal political order: following the power-sharing between the main warring factions under the 1+4 formula, namely one president and four vice-presidents, the peace process will lead to the organisation of elections in 2006.

During this “first African war”, the country was shaken by intense internal and external movements of populations. IDPs caused by conflict were moving from one place to another under difficult conditions, refugee fluxes found shelter on the territories of bordering countries: this general context had consequences on the stability and the displacements of populations in this country. Congolese populations were not displaced by war alone; the Eastern region suffers from seismic activity. In 1997, the volcanic eruption in Goma caused columns of people to flee towards Rwanda and towards the interior of the country. These ecologically displaced people are quite often ignored. In this respect, it is important to note
that these ecological migrants were not moving to bordering countries in large numbers: they soon returned to Goma. This historical picture is the background that allows understanding of the migratory dynamics in this country.

**The contents of the profile**

This document will be presented under the following three headings. The first heading describes the evolution of internal/international migrations towards and from the DRC. The second heading makes an analytical evaluation of the empirical and theoretical research on migrations. The third heading attempts to describe and fill the gaps in our knowledge on the research on migrations in this country. The elaboration of the third heading requires a comparative approach.

**The evolution of internal and international migrations to and from the DRC**

The history of migrations in the Democratic Republic of Congo cannot begin only from the post-colonial period. Indeed, such a perspective would be relevant but it would mask the complexity of the migratory phenomenon towards and from this territory.

*Migrations during the colonial period*

When the Congolese territory came into contact with Western civilization early in the 20th Century, that contact was made in the context of European societies seeking spaces to conquer and exploit. Initially, Congo belonged to King Leopold II who marveled at the wealth of this space. The extolling of the wealth of the Independent State of Congo led Leopold to create “the domain of the Crown” that comprised the unoccupied territory between the Lukenia basin and the Leopold II Lake in the Province of Bandundu, located in the centre-west of the country, close to the current location of the capital of DRC (Vangroenweghe, 1986: 221).

It is only after the frenzy of exploitation of rubber in order to bail out the personal finances of the Crown that public opinion learns of tragedy taking place in that territory – with no witnesses and far from the inquisitive eyes of Western journalists – with the scandal of the cut-off hand, a punishment meted to reluctant folks who failed to bring the rubber demanded by agents in the service of Leopold II (Hochschild, 1998). The terror in the quest for the valorisation of the territory even inspired such an aware mind as that of Josef Conrad who
wrote *Heart of Darkness*, a part-tragic, part-fantastic novel caricaturing the terror deployed in order to civilize the brutes living on the rich Congolese territory. It became clear from this description of the tragic history of the forced exploitation of the country’s resources that this territory, rich in natural resources, was under-populated. In view of the unequal mastery of technology, not only was the Congolese territory under-populated, but its population was also under-qualified. The people living on the territory did not possess the skills required to operate the machines that the white man was bringing in order to exploit the country’s resources. This led to a double movement that imposed itself as a response to the structural constraints of the colonial workings in the country: the first movement is the emergence of international migration through which the colony was to be populated by non-indigenous people, namely non-Africans nationals on the whole. These nationals came to work either for the colonial administration – in this case, Belgians essentially -, or for private companies, or even for religious missions. In this respect, nationalities as diverse as Greeks, Portuguese, Dutch, French, English or Americans can be found. In a published paper, Alexis M.G.F focuses on the extraction of the four main action thrusts by Belgian soldiers and missionaries in Congo (1896). Another work of approximately 400 pages by Comte L. de Lichtervelde (1932) describes the issues linked to the occupation of the Belgian Congo and the role played by Belgian nationals. The core of these two works locates accurately the initiation of the policies of occupation of the colony and the beginning of the exploitation of this vast territory, of, according to Derriks “[such] difficult access as to render the recruitment of European personnel all the more demanding” (Derriks, 1956).

The open-door clause stipulated and applied by the *régime* of free access to the Congo basin to all nations, their flags and their products was imposed at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) in the following terms: ”Trade by all nations will enjoy total freedom (…) in all the territories forming the Congo basin and all its tributaries … All flags, without distinction of nationality, will have free access to the entire coastline of the territories described above, to the rivers going into the sea, to all waterways of the Congo and its tributaries, including lakes, to all ports on the coastline, as well as to all canals that may be dug in future with the aim of linking the waterways and the lakes comprised in the territories described in Article One. They may undertake all kinds of transport and practice river and sea-barging as well as shipping with the same rights as nationals…Merchandise imported in these territories from all provenance, under whatever flag, by sea, by river, or by land, will have to pay a fair compensation for the expenses incurred by trading which, under this title, must be borne equally by nationals and by foreigners of all nationalities. All differential treatment is

Lengthy as it is, this quote is recalled in order to describe the free movement of persons and accordingly, Congo was soon receiving nationals from several European countries. In order to help realize the worth of the Congolese territory, immigration was an important stake. Indeed, the Congolese territory was not a “populating colony” in the colonial representation of the time, attracting masses of nationals from the colonizing power, but according to Josef Conrad’s metaphor, the demands of “civilization” imposed the presence of “civilisors” who must come from overseas. Thus is immigration explained: it is witness to the arrival of white people in Central Africa. Colonial documentation describes the debates among colonial circles on the question of Belgian immigration. Marzorati reminds of the political stakes of the European population when he writes that one of the policies was to support the establishment in Congo of an important ‘Belgian community’ that would settle there in order to make a lasting claim to Belgian sovereignty over Congo on one hand, and in order to offer a glimpse of a solution to the unemployment that might blight the homeland on the other hand (Marzorati, 1953; Perier, 1952).

In respect of European immigration into Congo, it goes without saying that when the territory passed under the colonial control of Belgium, “the national treatment clause” could only favour the preponderance of populating their colonial fiefdom by Belgians. Given the equatorial climate of the territory, Congo was not attractive enough to become a populating colony. Be that as it may, the Belgian predominance remains indisputable in the colonial public administration, in the management of private companies with Belgian capitals as was the case with the giant mining company ‘Union Minière du Haut Katanga’ (UMHK) and among religious missions (Derriks, 1956). What is the number of white (Belgian) agents in the colonial Congo?

The population of white agents is evolving quite timidly as is noted by Léon de Saint Moulin:”Whereas the population hardly exceeded en million inhabitants, it is nevertheless surprising that its administration was in the hands of 648 white agents in 1940, against 666 in 1934 and 845 in 193-1933. Their numbers reach one thousand in 1947. The extension of public services and the works under the ten-year Plan saw the numbers of the white staff in the colony increase to 3 000 in 1948, to 5 000 in 1952 and to 8 000 in 1958, in addition to 10 000 African auxiliaries at the latter date” (De Saint Moulin, 1988 : 211). Besides, according to Derriks en 1914, l’Union Minière du Haut Katanga, the large quoted mining
Company aiming to exploit the wealth of Katanga, employed a minimum of 50% of Belgians in their personnel in Africa (Derriks, 1956).

This Belgian preponderance was counter-balanced in some activity and investment sectors where nationals from other countries could be found. Neither are all immigrants into Congo Europeans: African nationals from neighbouring countries such as Northern Rhodesia, Rwanda-Urundi, and Asians –Chinese notably- are recruited as labourers in the mines of Katanga in the case of African nationals, or to build the railway linking the Congoolese hinterland to the West coast and the Atlantic ocean. That railway was a challenge that had to be taken up by the administrative body of Congo, thus echoing Stanley’s poignant discursive statement that “Without a railway, Congo is not worth a penny”.

In the period 1906-1911, it has been established that the black labourers employed by the Katanga Railways, by the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd and by l’Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) originated mostly from Rhodesia. As for labourers from Rwanda-Urundi in the mining industry of Katanga, it is only from 1924 that 4% of the workforce is recorded as nationals from that eastern neighbouring country, among the whole of the black workforce in the mines. Three years later, there is a marked increase in the number of labourers from Rwanda-Urundi, with their numbers reaching 24.5%. Between 1934 and 1949, the percentage of labourers from that origin drops (3.5% in 1934). This level remains constant or varies between 1% and 0.5% from 1934 to 1949: 1 in 1937; 0.5% between 1940 and 1946; 1% in 1949. The percentage increases in 1952 (8.5%) and in 1955 (15.2%)\(^1\).

In his research paper on Burundi migrants in the Belgian Congo between 1925 and 1927, Julien Nimbitso writes: “in order to find a workforce for its mining centres in the Belgian Congo, Belgium took into account the general demographic situation in Burundi and the regional variations in its population. It is in this context that Belgium determines and circumscribes the preferred regions of emigration (in the Burundi territory)” (Nimbitso, J. 1986: 32). A few numbers illustrate the statistics of the Burundi workforce recruited to work in Congo: 131 in 1935, 3 105 in 1938 and 1 060 in 1958 and it is noteworthy that the recruitment contract of the Union Minière du Haut in Burundi came to an end in 1957 (Nimbitso, 1986).

Immigration is not the only factor in this area. We also note emigration from the Belgian Congo. For instance, the presence of nationals from the Belgian Congo on the territory of Buganda is witnessed. The latter found themselves in this neighbouring territory in the

context of labour migration. These workers would undertake all kinds of activities required by the local development of the trading economy. They were town or country workers, domestic or otherwise (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1992:283). Likewise, nationals of ethnic groups straddling the borders of several territories can move easily from one place to another without the State public services documenting such movements.

Population movements inside spaces that regard as theirs, but split up later because they belong to different States, are part of what Luc Sindjoun calls the “ethnic or community transnationalism” (2002:66-67). In this respect, after gaining their independence, African States will take this situation into account to regulate these flows differently by adopting special régimes explicitly described thus by Sindjoun: “Ethnic or community transnationalism is usually taken into account by the territorial State on the subject of cross-border regions…; nationals of one state or another in border towns enjoy visa dispensations” (Sindjoun, 2002:66). Bakongo people can easily find themselves in the Belgian Congo and in Portuguese Angola; and Bakongo people are found on either side of the Congo River. Movements of population have been recorded between the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia territories. Elsewhere, Musambachime M.C makes a case study of the protest migrations when people leave one territory towards another. Congolese or Zambians (from Northern Rhodesia) conversely, have found themselves in the opposite territory in a context of social protest (Musambachime, 1988: 19-34).

The second movement is internal. It concerns the entire dynamic of implementation of the territorial state representing this country, which implied the mobility of the indigenous population from their villages towards the extra-customary centres created by the white colonial administration, or towards sites where nuclei of companies extracting the natural wealth of this country were establishing themselves. The urban growth in this country comes from the white light of colonisation. In this country, the city is the mirror of the transformation of African indigenous environments due to colonial influence. It amounts to saying that Congolese urbanisation is the product of colonisation; the towns were born from the need for the colonial administration to entrain social changes in this vast territory. This is part of the imperatives of political economics in the Belgian Congo, which can be summed up thus: “ensure production, ensure consumption, ensure transport of the produced goods for consumption, not only in the interests of Europeans, but also of the Congolese” (Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1952).

As Bustin writes, “Unlike West Africa, the Congo had no pre-European urban communities, and its towns literally sprang from the ground. Whether they owed their origin to commercial,
industrial, or administrative factors—or to a combination of all three—Congolese towns have had one common feature, the rapidity of their growth” (Bustin, 1963: 76-77).

In his research on migrations in the town of Lubumbashi, Dibwe dia Mwembo supports the colonial essence of that town’s creation when he writes: “In this context, the town of Lubumbashi was created *ex-nihilo*. In other words, Lubumbashi is a town created by colonisation and not as the result of the transformation of a capital by colonisation, as in the case of Kinshasa, Kananga, etc. Originally, Lubumbashi was a site 100% composed of immigrants until such time as technological evolution and other economic and political circumstances pushed the colonial administration to adopt a policy of stabilising the African labour force in urban centres” (Dibwe, 2005: 18).

With the creation of towns as a phenomenon linked to the demands of the colonial administration of conquered territories, the aspect of the dynamic of internal migration in its rural exodus form is also created. However, this is an exceptional type of rural exodus. While rural environments exist, namely traditional village communities, there are no cities in the modern sense. Towns, as colonial creations, are born as the expression of the “penetration” by the colonial administration that intends to ensure the territorial integration of the colony, such territorial integration being defined as “the progressive reduction of tensions and cultural and regional discontinuities in the horizontal plane within the process of creating a homogenous territorial political community” (Coleman & Rosberg, quoted by Sklar, 1967: 2-3).

Thus, indigenous African populations are asked to leave their traditional environments to move towards new places that will become urban centres in order to seek employment, whether voluntarily or forcibly. The colonial administration creates missions in order to recruit a workforce in some provinces of the colony. We have already mentioned the recruitment of workforce carried out in Rwanda-Urundi towards the Belgian Congo. A case in point is the creation of a public service by the colonial administration in order to channel population movements inside the colony. These missions are indigenous migrations and landless labourers, tracing back to the programme of valorization of the Rutshuru plain, as described by historian Nzabininana (2006).

The demographic growth in Congolese towns is driven by the creation of urban centres, as shown in the table below:

**Table 1: Demographic growth in towns in the Belgian Congo between 1935 and 1958**

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<tr>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td>26,622</td>
<td>46,884</td>
<td>110,280</td>
<td>221,757</td>
<td>332,230</td>
<td>367,979</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elizabethville</td>
<td>22,858</td>
<td>26,789</td>
<td>65,397</td>
<td>95,559</td>
<td>131,184</td>
<td>168,775</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stanleyville</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>60,742</td>
<td>74,936</td>
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<td>Matadi</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td>69,945</td>
<td>57,392</td>
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<td>Lulubourg</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>47,049</td>
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<td>56,432</td>
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Source: Bustin, *op.cit.*, p.77

These figures are not presented in a manner that allows distinguishing the non-African population from the indigenous Congolese population. They show the total population living in urban centres. Be that as it may, the indigenous Congolese population represents the majority of these new town-dwellers living in these environments created by the colonial enterprise. Bustin insists on this point when he writes: “In 1958, there were fifteen towns with a population of over 20,000 inhabitants, and 8.7 per cent of the total population lived in communities with an African population of over 10,000. These 1,178,865 persons, however, represented only a fraction of more than 3,000,000 Africans who had left their traditional environment” (1963: 77).

A study carried out in the mining province of Katanga, notably in the town of Elizabethville (nowadays Lubumbashi) arrives at the conclusions that the majority of the indigenous workforce population of the Union Minière is made up of people originating from other provinces of Congo. With 52.9%, people originating from Kasai are the most numerous, while those from other provinces account for 0.8%. 0.7% of the workers come from Rwanda-Urundi, and 12.8% come from foreign African colonies: Northern Rhodesia (Zambia nowadays) accounts for 9.4% (Toussaint, 1956: 232).

In the report on migrations in Lubumbashi, other details can be found on the presence of African workers coming from neighbouring territories. The report states: “The African population of Elizabethville is from various origins. From the moment of their arrival in 1906, l’Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) and the Compagnie ferroviaire du Bas-Congo & Katanga (BCK) were faced with the question of workforce. Upper Katanga was a region rich in mining resources but very poor in human resources. The poor demographics of the region led the colonisers to mobilise Congolese populations and those from neighbouring colonies, and to concentrate them around the mines…Having long been influenced by Britain and South Africa until 1920, the UMHK followed the methods used by the South-Africans in their
gold and diamond mines. It adopted the system of migrant labour: employers recruited an African workforce for a short period, from 3 to 12 months, and then sent the workers back to their villages of origin, having drained all the energy from them” (Dibwe, 2005: 21).

Seasonal migration allied to the policies of the mining companies in Katanga seemed to be contrary to the policy of managing the workforce when these companies were faced with a regular and steady growth. Thus, “from 1923, the UMHK decided to abandon the migrant labour system and adopted instead a policy of stabilisation of the African workforce. The company initiated its own recruiting missions in Rwanda-Urundi (1925), in Lomami-Kasaï (1926) and in Maniema (1927), regions reputedly densely populated” (Dibwe, 2005: 22).

Nimbitso’s research on Barundi migrants in Congo casts some light some aspects of the labour migration in the colonial context (Nimbitso, 1986).

The introduction of currency in the Belgian colony, followed by the policy of compulsory levy of taxes will force the Congolese population to enter modern economy. Seeking employment thus becomes a compulsory way of facing up to the colonial demand for taxes; of course, the exceedingly slow generalising of education tends to break traditional bonds. The attraction of the town, “the city of white people” gives a new aspect to the spatial development of the territory and to the internal mobility within the country. All these events play a part in the vast social change process at work in this colonial space.

During the colonial period, factors determining internal migrations are complex and cannot be reduced to single elements. Oucho & Gould make the point quite well that “almost all studies on migration recognize that economic drivers are necessary but are not sufficient to explain population movements. A large proportion of recent works seeks to identify causes by moving from the macro-scale, based on global conclusions drawn from structuralist analyses, to micro-scale, based on behavioural studies. Still, no single study can claim to establish an exhaustive list of all possible causes” (Oucho & Gould, 1996: 272). Thus, it is the repulsion factors at the local level in familiar surroundings (villages) that have a greater influence than the attraction of the cities. Actually, Congolese people ended up leaving their villages in order to flee from the chores imposed by colonial administration, such as having to carry property, goods and even white colonial agents on “tipoï” for no payment, or being recruited into the army.

When leaving their villages, these people were heading towards so-called extra-familiar centres (urban centres), although during the colonisation period, controls were strictly applied to the movements of population. In 1935, the colonial administration took steps to impose the compulsory registration on individual files of the indigenous population and the obtaining of a
movement passport for all travel, through Ordinances N°30/AIMO of March 14, and N°68/AIMO of April 15 (Obotela, 2002: 59). The role of the urban factor should be underlined because of its link to internal migration in colonial Congo as is the case in other African colonies; this is quite well explained by Coquery-Vidrovitch: “However, the migratory process does not simply come down to its economic dimension. *Homo economicus* exists in Africa as elsewhere; the disparity of income between rural and urban work, between African and Western work, is an obvious factor of mobility; but it is not the only one. […] people were hoping that the town would not only provide livelihoods but also a different ‘quality of life’ that would guarantee individual independence and a certain social prestige associated to ‘modernity’. But in the early 20s, this reflex only affected a tiny minority […] This emigration process diversified as social differences became more pronounced, at the point of departure and at the point of arrival; thus, after the Second World War, depending on the socio-cultural origin of the migrant, both the intensity and the diversity of the migratory pulses as well as the range of opportunities offered by the town, accelerated” (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1992:279-280).

It is obvious that all these human mobilities have had a considerable impact on the Congolese territory during the colonial period, with amplifying effects during the post-colonial period. Before assessing the impact of migrations on social, cultural and economic changes, it is important to extract some aspects of the evolution of migrations. A case in point is the changing directions of these movements, the complex and changing causes of migrations, the changes in migratory policy and the make-up of the migrating populations.

What were the directions of migratory movements during the colonial period? This is a difficult question, and it cannot be answered easily. What is noteworthy is that it is necessary to understand the administrative configuration of the Belgian Congo during the colonial period in order to gain a good understanding of the directions of migration. The administrative configuration of Congo during the period of the Independent State of Congo and of Belgian Congo is intimately linked to the process of ‘standardisation’, as expressed by Stein Rokkan (quoted by Ayoob, 1995: 17). The latter is the process of extending the effectiveness of the actions of the state as far as the last frontier of the societal system while equipping the political community with the same rules.

In the colonial context, such standardisation manifested itself through the shaping of the colonial territory thanks to an administrative partitioning. Léon de Saint Moulin understands the importance of this question when he writes: “The importance of an administrative organization lies in the fact that it is part of the organisation of the space through which man
steers his destiny. The creation of a communication infrastructure plays a more fundamental role in it but it is lengthy and costly. Conversely, a realignment of administrative boundaries is an easy decision for a government and it allows exerting some influence on the evolution of society” (Saint Moulin, 1988: 197). The Independent state of Congo was divided into eleven districts by Decree of August 1, 1888. What is the meaning of this division of the colony into districts?

The administrative division of the colony was actually answering two rationales. The first rationale stemmed from the need for Leopold II to assert the seal of sovereignty on the acquired territories. The second rationale was that of seeking the economic valorisation of various parts of the colonial space. Lengthy as it is, this quote from Saint Moulin expresses the aesthetics of the standardisation that the colonial administration intends to impress on this territory: “The Decree of 1888, like that of 1891, that divided the State into districts was above all an act of sovereignty. It intended to show that the Independent State of Congo (ISC) effectively occupied and controlled the territories that it was claiming. Therefore, the districts were organized in part to defend the borders: there are many districts in Lower Zaïre, which is a particularly important and vulnerable bottleneck; besides, the boundaries of all those to the east of Kinshasa converge towards the middle of the central basin. The latter is thus deprived of any proper centre and is marginalized in relation to the centres of the districts, facing more towards the exterior. The existence of five of the eleven districts between the coast and the Pool Malebo is also explained by the search for of an initial economic valorization of the part of the country most apt at ensuring its first exports. From 1887 to 1891, palm oil and palm nuts from Mayumbe and Lower Zaïre represent respectively 15.7 and 23.7% of exports earnings for the ISC…” (1988: 199-200).

The districts and other sub-divisions of the administrative organisation of the colony are thus deploying into a virgin space where everything had to be built. The various county-towns and other sub-divisions of the colonial administration are created and become nuclei for cities. These urban spaces are thus occupied by white civil personnel and Congolese population. The Congolese population recruited to work in auxiliary roles in the public colonial administration originates mostly from traditional village communities located in the environs of the urban sites. It is reported that the colonial administration controlled the movements of the Congolese population, on the one hand to prevent a rural exodus, and on the other hand to “discipline” the body of local population and avoid the emergence of movements that might awaken the anti-colonial conscience of the Congolese people. In the words of ordinance N° 68/AIMO of April 15, 1935, the ‘Movement passports for all displacement of the indigenous populations’
were an action of public administration constituting a form of exit visa given to the indigenous population when they sought to move from one area of the country to another. The recommendations of the indigenous manpower commission stressed the need not to exceed 10% of the number of adult and able men during recruitment, lest the life and development of traditional African groups be compromised; hence the control of the exodus of locals towards the extra-familiar centres – as far as was achievable- (Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1952).

Mayota and Lufungula present the free movement of populations within the colony or their enforced stay in their territories of origin as the dilemma facing the Belgian authorities in Congo. They state that many colonial agents denounced the detrimental effects of the rural exodus on the demography and the economy. These included an increasing de-population of villages located in the plains or on the banks of the Ngiri River mostly towards Coquilathville (Mbandaka today), and the exodus of the Libinza (a population from the province of Equateur) which caused serious problems for the collection of taxes, as well as difficulties for the administration in order to achieve works of an economic nature or to recruit a workforce to help commercial or industrial farming companies in the region (1990: 61-81).

At this level, two questions may be asked: the first concerns the efficacy of the controls while the second relates to the impact of such controls on the character of migration. These controls were relatively effective: up to a point, they allowed the colonial administration to record and track the internal movements of denizens (Obotela, 2002); but they failed to master the rural exodus during the colonial period: mention is made of the failure of the policy of controlling the indigenous populations (Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1952; Lemal, 1954; Lux, 1958; Mayota & Lufungula, 1990). As for the second part of the question, these controls had some influence on the gender differentiation of internal migration: only men and able men were allowed to move for work towards the extra-familiar centres. During the colonial period, the movements of women were very limited, if not non-existent. The predominance of masculinity in internal migration during the colonial period is stated throughout Africa, as is the case in the Belgian Congo. “During the colonial period, a very pronounced differentiation by gender characterized the recruitment of manpower, willingly or forcibly. Men were recruited for arduous tasks in the remunerated agricultural sector and in the mines. They also took up manual and administrative jobs in urban areas, but they were rarely allowed to bring the spouses or their families” (Oucho & Gould, 1996: 268).

Besides, it is important to note that the régime of controlling the movements of people was also implemented by the régime of President Mobutu (1965-1997). The ‘laissez-passer’ and the ‘autorisations de séjour’ (travel passes and residency permits) were administrative acts
that led to harassment on the part of the police and other bodies helping President Mobutu to keep control of the population (Young and Turner, 1985; Obotela, 2002).

At this juncture, we wish to touch upon the issue of analyzing the migratory experience in the colonial Congo by addressing the theoretical concept of the migratory system. For Mabogunje (quoted by de Hein, 2008: 148), the migratory system unravels the settling of spaces linked by the movements to and fro of populations, goods, services and information that tend to facilitate various exchanges, including migrations. Thus, during the colonial period, the direction of international migrations was from the mainland, from Europe even, towards the colony. Indigenous populations were not able to emigrate towards the mainland. Congolese populations living on the fringes of the borders were able to move from one territory to another. Internally, migrations were revealing the nature and the dynamic of the nascent movements within the colonial space: they were actually part of the wide social change process induced by the colonisation. Thus, these migrations were also taking part in the rationale of exploitation of the Congolese colony, a territory of immense wealth. During the period of economic boom, the development of economic activities on the basis of business creation required the presence of cheap labour. This workforce was extracted from traditional communities towards the new extra-familiar centres. These indigenous migrants were submitted to the régime of capitation and chores while living at a ‘social distance’ from the colonial management. Theodor Hanf describes it thus: “The locals were allocated separate living areas, they were obliged to leave the European's districts at sun-down and forbidden to frequent restaurants and bars. Schools were also segregated” (Hanf, 2006: 10).

At that time, migrations were labour migrations in a specific context of colonial division of labour. Besides, internal migrations caused important social transformations in the Belgian Congo. They allowed the development of cities; they contributed to the tortuous modernization of this land because the traditional environments had to go through changes as able men left, traditional power structures collapsed and women gained emancipation while giving parenthood an ever greater role. In urban environments, internal migrations allowed the population to access training, and it was intellectuals living in towns who gained awareness and militated towards the end of the colonial régime” (Denis, 1955; Lux, 1958; Deward, 1960; Aldous, 1962; Ndaywel, 1998; Mwela, 1987). What happened to migrations in the post-colonial period?

**Migrations during the post-colonial period**
Congo gained its independence under conditions that quickly degenerated into political and institutional instability. This instability is shown by the attempts at secession by two mining provinces, Katanga located in the south of the country and South-Kasaï, a province rich in diamonds, located in the centre of the country. Later, rebellions became widespread in Bandundu, in the Eastern Province and in the east of the country. The Congolese imbroglio was translated into a metaphor: ‘Congolisation’. Whether through a deliberate strategy or not, the Belgians were forced to leave the Congo en masse, leaving it without competent and experienced manpower to ensure the running of the State apparatus and of the public administration services. This return of Belgian and other expatriates in the context of the civil war can be compared to a return migration. This is a particular form of brain drain, the consequences of which are deeply felt in the country they flee from. This is also a particular form of brain drain because the departing ‘quality’ human resources are not nationals, but on the contrary foreign nationals, notably nationals from the former colonial mainland who ‘desert’ the ex-colony.

During the First Republic (1960-1965), immigration was hesitant, because of the political instability reigning in the country while ‘return migration’ and internal migrations were increasing. We have already described the outline of the return migration with the mass departure of the Belgian civilians working in the public and private sector of the ex-colony. This particular form of brain drain caused the collapse of the public administration in the new independent State. Internal migrations take the form of persons displaced internally by war. During the secession of Katanga (1960-1964), South-Katangese people supporting Moïse Tschombé were fighting against Baluba Katangese whose territory is in the north of the province, and also against Kasaians. The latter were forced to flee their homes and abandon their possessions to go and live in the safety of tent-camps on a site called “Foire” (Mwela, 1987: 103-117; Bakajika, 1997). There are no statistics of the numbers of these IDPs. However, it is obvious that the anti-Kasaian xenophobia led to movements of populations fleeing from Katanga, all heading towards their provinces of origin. Likewise, after the secession of South-Kasaï, populations of non-Luba ethnic origin had to flee from Mbuji Mayi, the county-town of the seceding province. The same goes for Luluabourg, a town located in the centre of the country and occupied by a majority of Bena Luluwa: some Baluba or Tetela people found themselves the object of pogroms and chased from the county-town of Kasaïan Unity (Ndaywel, 1998).

In this post-colonial context, IDPs are not the only case. At international level, the movements of DRC population migrating regularly towards other countries should be
mentioned. Among this lot, of light density, are those who migrate in order to study (young Congolese who receive bursaries to study in Belgium); there are also Congolese labour migrants: they are sent abroad to work in branches of Congolese companies in various European capitals (Bruxelles). Besides these regular migrations, what is most observed and documented concerns the flow of refugees stretching to the horizon into neighbouring countries. One can cite instances of Congolese refugees originating from Katanga who fled from the country to find shelter in Angola. They are called ‘Tigers’. Originally, ‘Tigers’ were people from the Lunda ethnic group, namely people from the Lwalaba district in Katanga. The people, whose numbers are difficult to evaluate, constituted a large colony that lived in Angola as a politico-military force taking part in the factional fighting rending that country. During the two Shaba wars, so-called Shaba 1 (1976) and Shaba 2 (1978), it was considered that the ‘Tigers’ were the spearhead of the attempt at destabilizing the régime of President Mobutu. The flows of Congolese refugees fleeing from their country and heading towards neighbouring countries were a continuing feature of the migratory landscape from this country as long as the situation was one of violence and political crisis (Ndaywel, 1998). Some stock of refugees from the 60s can still be found today in neighbouring countries like Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Brazzaville Congo, Zambia and Angola. The porous borders and the failure of the control services at the borders explain how Congolese people are able to cross their country in a rush towards the neighbouring countries. Thus, the Congolese are rushing towards countries offering opportunities for informal businesses such as the exploitation of diamonds in the militarized zones of Angola.

When President Mobutu seized power in 1965, he stabilized the political situation. This internal political stability contributed to the changing image of the country abroad. The attraction of the country as a site regarded as a geological scandal helps immigration to increase. Nationals from several countries come into this country as into an Eldorado, seeking gold nuggets and to conduct business. In Lubumbashi, there are at present people from Mali (originating from Kayi), from Senegal and from Angola. Malians and Senegalese are also found in other provinces of the country. In Kasaï, they are known as “Bawusa”, and as “Lingali” in Kinshasa, terms that carry no intrinsic meaning other than designate West-African nationals. The existence of ethnic groups on either side of the borders of this country adjacent to eight other countries causes constant movements to and fro, the extent of which is difficult to assess in the migratory dimension. In this context, the defining line between regular and irregular migration is quite tenuous. Thus, many Congolese nationals found in bordering countries have an uncertain status wavering between regular and irregular.
If the 60s were the years of imbroglio in the country, and therefore the characteristics of migration seemed to be dominated by forced migration, in the 70s the country witnesses a situation of political stability against a background of economic crisis, the symptoms of which will appear and exacerbate in the 80s. Consequently, the main features start to show, the framework for which, sourcing itself in the political economics of the country’s situation can help comprehend the dynamics of migrations into and from this country. At the bottom of the country’s situation, the economic crisis remains and worsens in the context of the imposition of structural programmes by the Bretton Woods institutions (Bagalwa, 2007; Omeje & Ngoie, 2008; Ngoie, 2007a; Ngoie, 2007b; Ngoie, 2008a).

Before we examine writings of the time on international migrations, it is important to note the predominance of internal migrations. The attraction of the cities is still a dominant feature. The polarization of development in urban environments as centres of power to the detriment of the countryside sets the scene for rural exodus. “The urban bias” in the infrastructure and in the development of the territory is quite marked during the Second Republic: the national development strategy models itself on polarized development and to that end three towns are designated as development poles in Congo. These are Kinshasa in the west, Kisangani in the north-east and Lubumbashi in the south. These three towns then begin to attract population from rural environments; this rural exodus is linked to the quest for employment and welfare that the countryside cannot provide (Diabonda, 1973; Dioko, 1983).

As far as international migrations are concerned, we should note that two periods form their basis in this country after the first ten years of independence (Ngoie, 2007a). In the first phase (1970-1980), emigration was quite hesitant. Still standing on a fragile footing, the Congolese State possessed the capacity to provide for some social services. Congolese people emigrating at that time were doing so under legal conditions in order to study, or to work abroad in the branches of large State companies like Générale des Carrières et des Mines, Air Zaïre airline, the National Office for Transport, the National Congolese Railway Company or the Congolese Maritime Company. The favoured country of destination was Belgium.

These are the features of this migration: firstly, it was the domain of the political and economic élite and it was undertaken by a few rich families. Next, many of the Congolese people who emigrated during that period have actually changed their nationality to acquire that of their country of destination. Finally, a few gifted young people at that time received study bursaries from the Congolese government, from American foundations (Rockefeller), or from the Catholic Church. At the conclusion of their studies, a few of them remained abroad.
They are the primary-migrants found in Belgium and in France (Dietschy, 2006; Ngoie, 2007a).

The second period (after 1980), still running, is characterized by various phases that introduce discontinuities according to the political conjuncture of the country. There are two conjunctures: the first is the economic crisis that takes place against the background of political impasse when President Mobutu, his régime having exhausted itself by its running on the spot, blocks any solution out of the crisis by clinging to power in a strategy trying to prevent transition (1990-1997). The second conjuncture unfolds in the shadow of the rebel wars, in the first place against the régime of President Mobutu who leaves office in 1997, and then the war of aggression to which the DRC is a victim, and which leads to the “first African World War”. However different these two conjunctures are, they are nevertheless characterized by a few common features. Firstly, the mass phenomenon of the Congolese migration flows and the diversification of the destination countries as well as the predominance of clandestines among the migratory flows (Lutatula, 2007). Kambayi Bwatshia offered a relevant analysis of the politically motivated migrations in this country. This is a notion that stems from a conceptual shift modelled on forced migration. Politically motivated migrations characterize the movements of populations leaving the country because of a dictatorship crackdown in that country. The Congolese leaving the country in this context seek and obtain exile elsewhere. Three waves of migrations mark that sequence in the DRC: the first wave starts with the nationwide hunt for the supporters of Lumumba after the arrest and assassination of Lumumba in 1961. The second wave follows the neutralization of Tshombé, triggering the persecution of his supporters; and the third wave occurs because of the dictatorship imposed by Mobutu during his long tenure (Bwatshia, 2007).

Internally, the permanent state of violence leads to massive displacements of populations. In the context of the instability and of the localized insecurity in the East of the DRC, UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs put forward a figure in excess of 3 million IDPs (OCHA/RDC, 2007 and 2008; UNHCR, 2007). Figures are always a source of problems to represent public life in the DRC because they can be falsified, according to Benjamin Rubbers (2005: 57-66). However, Table 2 shows the location of IDPs in 2003.

Table 2: displaced persons in the DRC provinces
The situation of Congolese refugees throughout the world amounts to approximately 431,000 according to the data collated in January 2006. Their numbers are greater in Africa than in other continents.

Table 3: Refugees from the DRC in Africa and in the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African countries</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>61,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>20,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>20,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>3,300</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe and America</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,100</td>
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</table>
The failure by the decadent régime of former president Mobutu to establish democracy, as well as the war that erupts in 1996 are the factors that accelerate the fall of the country into crisis and the multiplicity of strategies deployed by Congolese people to cope with the crisis. Migration is but one of these strategies (De Rosny, 2002: 624; Sumata et al. 2005). It could be said that this is a repetition: in fact, migration acquires a sociological depth and a positive social value expressed by phrases such as “Miguel”, “Mpoto”, or “Mpoto eza lola”. These terms, used in local dialects in the DRC translate the paradise-like character of developed countries like the USA and those in Europe. Families with members in the Diaspora are respected in the country and boast about it at weddings, funerals or important events. Nowadays, remittances from abroad are the livelihood of many households in large towns and even in villages: they are part of the monthly budget of families in the DRC (Sumata, 2002: 619-628; Sumata et al, 2004).

The mass phenomenon of migratory flows leaving this country takes a relative depth and form of brain drain. From Lubumbashi, Congolese people—mostly doctors and engineers—seek employment in Zambia, in Zimbabwe, in Namibia and in South Africa (Fidani, 1993: 52-54; Bouillon, 1997; Kazadi, 1999: 17; Dietschy, 2006). In the East, Rwanda and Burundi attract Congolese labour migrants who are very useful as teachers in primary and secondary schools. The diversification of destination countries can be observed quite easily: one can find in there South Africa after it opened its doors following the end of apartheid, Nigeria, almost all the neighbouring countries of the DRC, the United States and Canada as well as countries in Western Europe.

When discussing the migration of Congolese towards South Africa, Kazadi describes them as three waves and he writes: “Congolese emigration to South Africa started in 1960, encouraged mainly by two factors: the establishment of official diplomatic contacts between the De Klerk government and the Mobutu administration in 1989 and the initiation of political reform by former President De Klerk in February 1990. There have been three major waves of Congolese emigration to South Africa. The first wave lasted from 1990 to 1992, and the immigrants were mainly middle class. Unprecedented level of socio-economic degradation and quick deterioration of living conditions propped up the first wave of emigration…” The

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>18,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>431,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

second wave (through 1993) was mainly the result of political instability. The 1993 army mutiny, riots and pillages caused the highest rate of emigration from Congo to South Africa. In contrast to the first wave, which was dominated by middle class people, the second wave was quite undifferentiated in terms of social class. The poor as well the rich decided to leave the country… The last wave of emigration, the shortest, occurred in May 1997, when the barons of the former Zairian regime and their families fled the DRC after Mobutu’s poorly paid soldiers were defeated by Kabila’s Uganda and Rwanda-backed rebels” (Kazadi, 1999: 15-16).

Young Congolese men and women are becoming increasingly visible in the migratory field. According to data from the Belgian police, Congolese applying for papers to regularize their stay in Belgium are aged between 25 and 35 (Le Soir, January 6, 2006; Ngoie, 2007a; Lutatula, 2007).

Young men and women, these are two categories emerging in the migratory field in a context of “radicalisation of uncertainties”, as was expressed by Zaki Laïdi in 1997. Among the young in the DRC, children alone, unaccompanied must be included. There are no statistics on this issue. But there is evidence that the children of the street, so-called shegue, do not become expatriates to live permanently in neighbouring countries like Congo-Brazzaville or Gabon; they go there to make a living with the intention of coming back to the home-country with pocketfuls of money. As they are not subject to administrative controls at the border post of Beach Ngobila, the children use the subterfuge of accompanying handicapped persons towards Brazzaville Congo. Once they have crossed the river, and they are on the other side of the border, these young people set forth into the wide world to make a living in the Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon (Ngoie, 2008b).

A research report showing the migratory profile for the central African region provided statistical data on the evolution of the numbers of Congolese migrants in certain countries of the European Union. In that document, we find these comments: “There has been a surge in the numbers of Congolese people admitted to countries of the European Union in 2000. Three countries (Belgium, Germany and France) account for 80% of Congolese people migrations. According to MDS\(^1\), 3.784.000 Congolese people are resident abroad, against 2.136.000 in

1995. Western Europe receives more than 45% of Congolese expatriates, North America receives 30%, and Africa receives 15%. The most pronounced phenomenon of the last few years is that of the expatriation of Congolese people towards Anglo-Saxon countries. 31% of Congolese expatriates belong to the socio-professional category of ‘upper management and white-collar professions’. Over 65% of all senior managers and researchers in Congo would have become expatriates” (Ndione and Pabanel, 2007: 32-33).

Statistical data on Congolese migrants living in other African countries constitute a challenge that must be answered. During our stay in Bujumbura, we have attempted to obtain such data from the services of the DRC Embassy: the reply was that we must wait for the registration cards of Congolese people to be updated in order to obtain exact information. We received the same reply from the DRC consular services in Ndola, Zambia. On the whole, many Congolese people can be found in neighbouring countries and it is difficult to obtain data on their numbers because of the calamitous management of population movements at the borders that the DRC shares with a further nine other countries –such management is carried out in an oral fashion-. Indeed, according to the dispositions of presidential ordinance n° 87-281 of August 13, 1987, the various documents required to enter the DRC are listed, as well as the various types of valid visas. These are the transit visa, the travel visa, the settling visa of duration from 1 to 5 years, and the exit and return visa. Authorisation documents for entering and leaving the territory are issued by the services of the ‘Direction Générale des Migrations’ and a Passport and visa exemption is extended to people living in the border areas, within a 15 km radius and for a duration of 72 hours. Thus, these inhabitants enjoy easy entry and exit: they only need to buy a token that allows them to cross the border. This facility facilitates the emigration of Congolese people and conversely the immigration of people living near the borders towards the DRC.

Elsewhere, at the border between the DRC and Angola, and between the DRC and Burundi and Rwanda, it should be noted that some movements of “seasonal and temporary migrations” exist (Rea and Tripier, 2003: 5). Seasonal migrations are those taking place at certain times, such times correspond to particular activities that require large numbers of persons. In the dry season, movements of Congolese people crossing the border towards Angola and the artisanal exploitation of diamonds can be observed. The phenomenon of temporary migrations is observed at the eastern borders of the DRC: Congolese teachers working in Rwanda own two
dwellings, each located in one of the two countries. Depending on their teaching time-table, they leave the town of Bukavu and live in Rwanda for four or five days. They then spend the week-end in the DRC (Bigega, 2007, Anonymous, 2007).

Here are a few attempts at providing statistical data on the emigration of Congolese people from the DRC towards some African countries. In Cameroun, the migrant population from the DRC represented 0.2% of the whole foreign population. In the Central African Republic, interesting data are being analysed. There, while Congolese people represent 39% of the foreign African population, the proportion of women among Congolese migrants amounts to 50.3%; the masculine proportion of the foreign population from the DRC amounts to 49.7%. The age tranche of the majority of these Congolese migrants varies from 15 to 29 years. 48.9% of Congolese migrants living in the Central African Republic possess no formal education. In the Congo-Brazzaville, Congolese migrants from the DRC form the majority of the foreign population. In Gabon, the proportion of Congolese migrants is 5.1% (Ndione and Pabanel, 2007: 12-15).

The illegal aspect of migration during this period is the label applied to Congolese migrants abroad (Bingdungwa, 2008a and 2008b; Ngoie, 2008b). Popular imagination has created the term ‘Ngulu’¹ to describe this generation of clandestines who emigrate en masse towards the United States, Europe and other African countries. A pop musician has even been caught by the French police and has been condemned for successfully maintaining a network of illegal entries for several Congolese migrants into France (Ngoie, 2007b). Generally, African countries like South Africa, Nigeria or Senegal, are not destination countries, but actual transit routes for migrants towards ‘Eldorado’ in Europe, Canada or the United states (Ngoie, 2008b).

The numerous restrictions and obstacles raised to prevent Congolese people from obtaining visas have led the latter to imagine several stratagems to slip through the net and emigrate clandestinely. Among these stratagems, one can mention the transaction consisting in changing nationality and identity all along the migratory journey prior to entering the destination country. The Lingalese term ‘Kobuaka nzoto’ means literally ‘throw away the body’. The aim is to change the name and the identity by becoming ‘another person’

¹ Ngulu, in the local DRC idiom, is a pig. This animal metaphor intends to remind the inhuman conditions under which clandestines leave the country in their ‘journey to Hell’. In Congolese culture, the pig is a dirty animal wallowing in mud and snorting through it.
elsewhere in order to achieve the essential objective of living abroad, even anonymously. This transaction reminds of the moral of ‘Bana lunda’ as described by Filip de Boeck (2001:171-208) when he mentions young people seeking diamonds and dollars at the risk of their lives in Angola during the civil war, stooping as low as making fetishes and having sexual relations with their own mother to gain success and diamonds. Thus, depending on the networks and the migration routes, it is easy to find ‘South-African’ Congolese, ‘Angolese’ Congolese, ‘Burundese’ Congolese, ‘Rwandese’ or ‘Tanzanian’, etc (Ngoie, 2008b).

Indeed, it is often difficult to obtain information on the networks and the itineraries of irregular migration. It is often the clandestine migrants who reveal aspects of these trajectories. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that Congolese attempting clandestine migration seek all opportunities that would allow them to obtain entry papers (visas) to the territory of any State of the European Union, and once there, they vanish from view (Ngoie, 2008b).

Religious faiths in the DRC, from the Catholic Church or from new churches and teams of athletes, become the bridges through which Congolese people make use of the networks to emigrate. Thus, without recounting the fantastic stories of such networks, one can mention that in 2000, for instance, about one hundred young Congolese vanished during a pilgrimage of Catholic mothers to Rome¹. Likewise, when Congolese players find themselves in Europe for training sessions, some fantastic stories describe the defection of such or such player. In Belgium, during the stay of the women Congolese basket-ball team in 2005, two players ‘evaporated into thin air’. Awareness-raising campaigns targeting such groups as young people are conducted, aiming at discouraging them from such practices in order to put an end to these dangerous clandestine migration ventures from the DRC. With support from some governments in the UE [Belgium and France], NGOs have launched operation “Vanda na Mboka”, a Lingalese phrase that stresses the aim of the campaign: “Stay in the country” (Bindungwa, 2008a and 2008b).

In respect of international migration, the context that we have just described in synopsis is characterized by a powerful “informalisation” (Chabaz & Daloz, 1999) of economic life, and of political life even. The informalisation of political life occurs under the mode of producing a régime of power that exists and survives thanks to “élite networks”, according to the terms

¹ www.voxdei.org
of the UN Report on illegal exploitation of natural resources in Congo: these networks have invested the Congolese State and pervert it increasingly by giving it a particular orientation that is disconnected from concerns about national development and the quest for the welfare of the population. These networks comprise political authorities, the military, business-men and transnational criminal groups (UN, 2002). At the economic level, informalisation of life is unfolding as the multiplication of activities that most often find their resources in ‘subterraneity’, as Alain Tarrius expresses it (2005:2): such activities are the livelihood of the majority of the Congolese population. The straddling between the official or formal economy and the informal economy in the DRC is such that it is a vain hope to try and distinguish their demarcation because their entwining is so fluid and changing from one day to the next and from one sector to another, one calling upon the other and vice-versa (Trefon et al. 2002: 379-388). While MacGaffey took a deep interest in the ‘second economy’ (quoted by Niger-Thomas, 2000: 45-46) in the DRC, that adjective hides a deep reality: in this country, many households are dependent on it every day; therefore would it not be appropriate to call it the ‘first economy’, the most important one? In view of this fact, we can understand the dynamic of feminine mobility in this country (Ngoie, 2007b).

The visibility of women in the migratory field in the DRC is more an empirical reality than something that can be accounted for by discourse. The emergence in the discourse of feminine mobility seems to be lagging. Women on the move are becoming actors reflecting the dynamic of the workings of informal activities in the DRC.

From the 90s, the steep descent of the DRC in the inflationist spiral of armed violence has led to population movements: refugees as well as IDPs. Publications from UN humanitarian agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) give an account of these movements, mostly in Eastern Congo (OCHA/RDC, 2007 and 2008). Likewise, there are mentions in documentation of the expulsions that Congolese people were subjected to in Angola during 2006-2007. According to the Monuc spokesman, more than 22 230 Congolese have been expelled from Angola. These flux of returning Congolese people affected four provinces of the DRC that have borders with Angola. These are the provinces of Katanga, both Kasaï and Bandundu. These ‘enforced’ return migrations have exposed the fragility and the insufficiencies of the Congolese State public services structures. Swamped by the mass arrival of Congolese people, the Congolese State was helped out by NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF-France, MSF-Belgium, MSF-Spain, etc.) and UN humanitarian organisations like UNICEF and UNPD.
About the empirical and theoretical research on migration in (on) the DRC

An obvious contrast must be noted between the vastness of the country and the complexity of migrations in their double movement of immigration and emigration on one hand, and the scarcity, the insufficiency even, of research and publications on these matters in the country on the other hand. According to historians, public services archives were kept up-to-date during the colonial period, (Saint Moulin, 1987 and 1988); but all these archives are lost nowadays due to the ransacking suffered by the country. With regard to the documentary research carried out, even if it is obvious that we cannot say that we secured all publications, is the figure of 205 titles presented in our report on bibliographical research not an expression of how insufficient the coverage of empirical studies of migrations in the DRC is?

Be that as it may, we will introduce the knowledge generators before attempting to decode the meaning of the emerging theoretical frameworks that might provide guidance to empirical studies in this country.

In Lubumbashi, the Centre for Research and Documentation of Central Africa (CERDAC) operating close to the History Department of the University of Lubumbashi, is attempting to reconstitute some archives of the colonial period. As far as the archives of the DRC public services are concerned, access to them is very limited because they are not available. Even recent data that could be presented in monthly and annual reports are not kept up-to-date. The Centre of Excellence for the Study of Local Democracy (CEDEMOL)¹ has been operating since 2007. Further to some field-research in rural territorial entities in the district of Lualaba in Katanga, some research reports mention the demographic and economic situation of certain territories that share their borders with Angola and Zambia. The Observatory for Urban Change (OUC) has already launched its own research into migrations in the city of Lubumbashi.

In Kinshasa, the International Organisation for Migrations (IOM) has a representative office and is starting the task of elaborating the national migratory profile in the DRC. Offices of the IOM can be found in certain provinces of the country. The return of Congolese migrants to the country is causing some concerns for the IOM. The African Migration and Development programme (AMD / MIDA) launched by the Belgian federal service of Foreign Affairs is

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¹ CEDEMOL and OCU are active through the University of Lubumbashi.
undertaking field-work in the context of promoting migration in the development of African countries, and it has published reports and analyses on the subject of migrations in the DRC and in the African great Lakes.

In the context of its creation, the MIDA/Great Lakes programme has launched a operation of mobilisation of the scientific and technical Diaspora of DRC nationals to encourage them to return, under the ‘recourse’ option scheme, and contribute to the reconstruction of the higher education institutions and universities of their country and to their running. Congolese migrants who gained a Doctorate in some countries of the European Union (Belgium, France) have thus returned briefly to their country to teach in Congolese universities. Some research into remittances and their impact on the development of the countries of the African Great Lakes has taken place: the results of this research are available (See the bibliographic research of the DRC) (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2005, Sumata et al. 2004).

In the Congo-Brazzaville, the REDIMAC network exists. Its visibility manifests itself in the organisation of scientific activities, including holding an international congress on “Migrations and territorial reconstitutions in Central Africa” from December 13 to 15, 2006 in Brazzaville. Researchers from the DRC in the field of migrations take part in the activities that this network organises occasionally. In 2008, a congress planned by REMIDAC on clandestine migrations in Central Africa was due to host researchers from the DRC.

Returning to the research carried out on migrations in the DRC, it should be noted that this field was first and foremost invested by Congolese demographers and geographers. In this respect, we can mention the important research work undertaken by Congolese professor Lututala Mumpasi. A demographer, and currently Rector of the University of Kinshasa, this writer defended his Doctorate thesis on migrations in Congo-Kinshasa at the University of Laval. A few of his published titles are presented in the document on the bibliography of the DRC. Congolese geographers have taken an interest in some aspects of migrations, with analyses of the rural exodus, of the urban-rural migrations and their impact on that space. Congolese students have attempted some research through such end-of-cycle works and memoirs –probing works-. Such works are not well preserved in university libraries. The Jesuit father Léon de Saint Moulin, historian and demographer, currently working at the Centre d’études pour l’Action sociale (CEPAS) which publishes a magazine called Congo-
Afrique, has carried out some research in this field and he has published some studies on the demography and the economic situation in the DRC.

In Lubumbashi, Professor Dibwe dia Mwembo, historian at the Faculté des Lettres et sciences humaines of the University of Lubumbashi and currently in charge of the Observatory for Urban Change, takes an interest in the issue of migrations. He is a collaborator in a research project conducted by the University of Witwatersrand of South Africa, i.e. a comparative study of migrations and urban transformations in four African towns: Johannesburg, Nairobi, Maputo and Lubumbashi. Likewise, this Professor was associated with some research by a few universities in southern Africa on forced migrations in the southern African space.

A bibliographic overview of documentation on migrations in the DRC allows noting the following. Analyses of a theoretical extent are quite rare. Their percentage is quite low. Such a low percentage is explained by the absence of a research tradition in this field. Thus, in another essentially theoretical text, Professor Lututala mentions the patent theoretical deficit that can be detected in the field of migrations for the post-colonial period in general and in the DRC in particular. He wishes to take up this challenge by elucidating and summing up the main explicative theoretical models likely to throw some light on the debate when one wishes to study migrations in post-colonial Africa (Lututala, 1995: 391-416). Thereafter, and in the writings of Professor Lututala, the conceptual framework of “residential ubiquity” as a matrix capable of explaining the migratory dynamic of Congolese people emerges as a follow-up to the theory of migratory networks. This matrix explains the reluctance of Congolese migrants to return to the home country even when their situation is quite precarious in the destination country (Lututala, 2005: 409-429). Empirical analyses are quite numerous. Thus, during the colonial period, some studies and monographs on internal migration were conducted in the perspective of “urban ecology”: the aim was to analyse the transformations in a town and in the relationships between its inhabitants grouped in urban and ethnic communities without evoking the migratory policy (Rea and Tripier, 2003). During the colonial period, studies on social and urban transformations take into account the concept of movement of the indigenous population and its impact on the colonised space (Denis, 1955; Deward, 1960; Aldous, 1962). After the independence, studies of the urban ecology assess the social changes, the social problems (unemployment, delinquency, urban violence, etc.) and the difficult urban governance in the context of a failed state while urban environments are still a pole of attraction for the populations (Aldous, 1962; Diabonda, 1973; Dioko, 1983; Kankonde, 1993; Trefon, 2004; De Boeck et al., 2005).
Indeed, the questions of migrations find renewed interest in the conjuncture of the war of aggression that the country was suffering. In that context, questions of migrations carry a heavy political loading: one wishes to understand and explain the “sociological otherness” and the “judicial otherness”, using these phrases from Rea and Tripier as variables explaining the conflict raging in the east of the DRC. When the rebellion supported by the neighbouring countries broke out in 1996, the problematic of the ethnic minorities was strongly instrumented. Documentation on migration and on the conflict proliferated. The politicising of the debate on the nationality of the ethnic minorities in Eastern DRC led to practices of hiding and/or falsifying documents.

Besides, UN humanitarian agencies like OCHA were publishing statistical data on IDPs, thus alerting the international community to the human drama that was unfolding in the conflict zones. Before closing that point, it is important to say a few words about the meaning of the emerging theoretical frameworks that would provide guidance to empirical studies in this country. Evidently, there are none. If such theoretical frameworks exist, they are reprised theoretical frameworks elaborated elsewhere, the extent of which researchers wish to test in the context of the DRC (Lutatula, 1995). Some efforts at establishing a theory are appearing in university research works (scientific journals, doctorate theses, higher education diploma memoirs or graduate memoirs). The analyses presented in newspapers are empirical reports with no theoretical depth. It is the absence of a research programme in the field of migrations that should be held responsible for this lack of theoretical frameworks.

**On the lack of research in the field of migration**

While research in the field of migration is still nascent and has yet to reach the level of saturation seen in some countries like Mexico, China or the United States, research initiatives are occurring at academic level. What are the research questions that need to be raised?

From the small overview of the documentation reviewed, it appears that the dynamic of migration that can be observed currently in the DRC is not the object of any analysis yet. Thus, since the end of the war in 2001, the DRC has been very attractive in the context of the mining sector boom. Investors from China, India, Korea and Pakistan are becoming increasingly visible in the country. In the Katanga Province, approximately 280 mining companies belonging to the Chinese were created shortly after the elections held in 2006. Whereas Asian nationals are forming the new wave of migrants, migrants from other
nationalities have been established for a long time. This is the case of migrants from Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. Nationals from the first two countries have lived in the DRC for several generations. Nigerians are visible in the capital of the country and occupy spaces that become markers for their commercial monopoly in certain niches of activity. In Lubumbashi, Malians and Senegalese, commonly called ‘Ouestaf’, are more visible still because the live in areas where they engage in distinguishing activities like jewelry or the bullion trade. These questions are not seen in discursive domains extending to analyses of the migrations in the DRC.

Next, another aspect of the migratory reality concerns clandestine migrations. According to the media, the ‘clandestine’ label is applied as soon as Congolese migrants going abroad are mentioned. While clandestinity has an obvious empirical importance in migrations, it has yet to receive proper attention among academic researchers. Indeed, local media mention it, but this question is not the object of systematic in-depth study. In the third instance, the feminisation of migrations from the DRC is becoming increasingly important. Yet, this question is still unanswered or treated in as marginal point. The fourth aspect that should deserve attention relates to initiatives taken by street-children, so-called ‘Shegue’ in the migratory field. In Kinshasa, the Shegue are increasingly actors in movement who cross the Congo River and invade Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon. The Shegue want to export their survival strategies from Kinshasa to other places, under other skies. While they are near their parents, these children have no ‘home of their own’, and they wish to invade the world. These questions do not appear in the catalogued documentation.

The fifth missing element can be located at the level of the methodological debate about migration questions. This debate does not exist. Some attempts at scientific debate have taken place between researchers, but these took place in the broad context of social sciences. In that maze, Professor Lututala Mampasi has described the experience that he lived while conducting research among Congolese migrants living in Paris (Lutatula, 2006: 117-124). Such questions of methodological research in analyses of migrations in this country are undertaken and dealt with pragmatically, without raising controversy as is the case in other countries. This deficit is instructive: it allows taking the measure of the paucity and of the scarcity of in-depth studies of this subject.

The sixth missing element concerns the lack of statistical data on migratory movements in the DRC. In this instance, this is a failure from the public services where one can expect to find
some archives on the subject. Such archives do not exist. Or, where they do exist, public access to them is difficult. The modernisation of the Direction Générale des Migrations services may augur an interesting future: access to computers for migration officials in airports can facilitate the reconstitution of data needed for research. Besides, the IOM in the DRC has launched a campaign of coverage with the aim of elaborating a migratory profile of the country: this strategic document could fill the gaps that we deplore in this respect.

**Conclusion**

Should we conclude? Or, rather, how can we conclude such a study? While recognising that the entire complexity and diversity of migrations in this country have not been uncovered, it is important to note the following. Firstly, this country has been founded in the context of immigration, and has been a country of immigration at international level while internally, migrations from traditional environments towards the urban centres of colonial creation have constituted the architecture of the migratory field. This country’s accession to independence in a context of tribal violence and of clashing interests from the big powers upsets the migratory landscape of the country: the hunt for white men causes a return migration. As it passes into the red zone of instability, the DRC repulses more than it attracts while internal migrations unravel the diversification and the return movements of the indigenous populations forced to go back to their territories.

As long as it is linked to the subject of migrations, this snapshot of the DRC has remained almost unchanged: thus this country becomes a country of immigration and emigration at the same time. The extent of one aspect or another depends on the political conjuncture, itself subject to attractiveness or otherwise at an economic level. Following the running of the elections in 2006, if not well before that date, that binary feature is still a characteristic of the country. Besides, the clandestine label is increasingly applied to migrations from the DRC. Migratory routes are created and recreated according to the imaginative resources of the networks and connections specializing in that field.
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